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C.

Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, plus Rules 3 and 4, Utah
Court of Appeals.
P.

Nature of Proceedings

This is an Appeal from an Order of the District Court
denying Defendants' Motion To Set Aside The Judgment And
Sanctions pursuant to Rules 55 and 60.
E.
I.

Statement of Issues on Appeal

Where Defendants' attorney was activated during certain

periods of the Desert Storm Crisis which in part lead to certain
papers not being produced and answered, should the Court upon
being appraised of the matter set aside the Judgment and
Sanctions.
II.

Where one of the Defendants, Clare Morse had not

appeared for several of the Supplemental Orders, should this be a
part of the criteria for denying the judgment to be set aside
where Defendant Clare Morse had depended upon his attorney to
take care of the Supplemental Order.
F,

Determinative Status

The statutes and Rules which Defendants Clare T. Morse and
Transamerica Equities, Inc. believe may be determinative are
copied or set forth in their entirety in Appendix XIV. hereto.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
A,

Nature of the Case

The record now before the court establishes the following
facts that are material to Plaintiff's Motion:
1.

In response to service of the Summons and Complaint in

the above matter upon the defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc.
and Clare T. Morse, an answer was filed and served by mail on
behalf of Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. Morse on or
about January 11, 1992.
2.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton).

On July 10, 1991, Clare T. Morse and Transamerica

Equities, Inc. learned for the first time that a Judgment had
been obtained against Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T.
Morse in the instant matter when he was personally served by a
constable with a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings.
(Affidavit of Grant Orton)
3.

Transamerica Equities, Inc.'s registered agent was never

served with the Supplemental Order.
4.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton)

Defendants' attorney, Grant Orton was out of town on a

military call up during most of the time period of January June, 1992. Grant Orton7s Affidavit states that he had never
received notice of plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions and Default
Judgment nor Judgment which followed.

(Affidavit of Grant

Orton).
5.

According to Grant Orton's Affidavit, mail is delivered

to a mail box in front of the building where his office is
located.

During the months of January thorough May 1991, Grant
2

Orton had numerous military assignments outside of the State of
Utah.

During that time normally the mail would have been

retained by the Postal Service if his part-time secretary did not
pick it up in a timely fashion.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton).

In the past when this happened, it has been retained by
the post office for it to be picked up there. Upon checking with
the post office Grant Orton found that this was not the case
since there is no such mail retained by the Postal Service, nor
had his secretary picked up the mail.

In other words, he did not

receive the mailings from Plaintiffs.

(Affidavit of Grant

Orton).
6.

Had Grant Orton become aware from any source that a

Motion preliminary to the granting of judgment and sanctions had
been served in any manner, including by mail, he would have taken
the action necessary to timely prepare, file and serve an
appropriate response thereto and he would not have permitted or
suffered any judgment or sanctions to have been entered against
the Defendant herein, without his answering said motions.
(Affidavit of Grant Orton).
7.

Defendants have, hold and claim valid and meritorious

defenses to each of the claims and issues that are raised in and
that are the subject of the Complaint and has asserted them in
his Answer.
8.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton).

Defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc. nor Clare T.

Morse did not receive notice of the Motion for Sanctions and
Judgment.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton, Affidavit of Clare Morse).
3

9.

Defendants did not receive Notice of Plaintiffs' Motions

nor have they found those notices*

(Affidavit of Grant Orton,

Affidavit of Clare Morse).
10.

That Grant Orton was attorney for Defendant Clare T.

Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. and all defenses for
Transamerica Equities included Morse.

(Affidavit of Grant Orton

and Affidavit of Clare Morse).
11.

That Clare Morse did not receive notice of any of

Plaintiff's notices.
12.

(Affidavit of Clare Morse).

Defendants Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities did

not have notice of any of the lack of response and therefore were
dependent upon their attorney to represent them in this matter.
(Affidavit of Clare Morse).
B,

Course of Proceedings

Clare Morse, upon having received the July 10, 1991
Supplemental Order and giving it to his attorney Grant Orton to
have the Court set the Judgment Aside, Grant Orton was again
called up on active duty, and he and the Defendants requested
present counsel Wesley Sine to take over the lawsuit for
Defendants.

Well within the 90 days from the time of Judgment, a

Motion To Set Aside The Judgment was filed by the Defendants.
C.

Disposition At The Hearing

After a hearing before the Honorable Judge Wilkinson, the
Court ruled that since Defendant Clare T. Morse had failed to
show up for two Supplemental Orders that he would not Set the
Judgment Aside.

(See Transcript page 10, lines 5-21, page 11,
4

lines 1-4)
Defendants then in a timely fashion appealed the Court's
decision to the Utah Supreme Court who through is pour over
powers transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
P.
1*

Relevant Facts

According to the Affidavit of Grant Orton, he did not

receive notice of Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions and Judgment.
(See Affidavit of Grant Orton, paragraph 3)
2.

The Motion To Set Aside Plaintiff's Judgment was filed

within 90 days of the filing of the Judgment.
3.

Defendants had no notice of the Judgment until being

served with the Supplemental Order.

(See Affidavit of Clare

Morse, paragraphs 7, 8, and 9)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., provide for relief
from the entry of defaults and default judgments for good cause
shown and for (b)(1), "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect".

The applicable standard is stated as follows

in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor,
Inc., 544 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them upto-date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that
the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice
between them. In conformity with that principle, the courts
generally tend to favor granting relief from default
judgments where there is any reasonable excuse unless it
will result in substantial prejudice or injustice ot the
adverse party.

5

The facts established by the record now before the Court clearly
satisfy the requirements of Rule 55(c) and 60(b) and compel the
granting of the relief sought by Defendant's Motion.

The failure

of Defendants to file and serve a timely and appropriate response
to the Motions for Sanctions and Judgment brought by the
Plaintiff was caused by problems both with the mail (Orton nor
Morse received the notices), and with Grant Orton serving
military duty during the war in Kuwait during January - June
1991.

The failure was not the result of poor practices,

carelessness, or lack of concern on the part of Defendants, but
rather a problem with the mail in part caused by Defendant Orton
being called up in the military during this period.

Moreover,

defendants have, hold and claim, and are fully prepared to
assert, good and meritorious defenses to each of the claims and
issues that are raised by and that are the subject of the
Plaintiff's Complaint•
ARGUMENT
Although a litigant is often charged with his attorney's
misconduct, the rule may not apply with equal force to default
judgments.

See 21 ALR3d 1255 and cases there cited.

The courts

have demonstrated their willingness to relieve innocent clients
from the consequences of their attorney's negligence in certain
circumstances by recognizing exceptions to the general rule.
Such relief is often limited to extraordinary circumstances,
such as where the attorney';s neglect is extreme, or counsel has
actually abandoned his responsibilities.

6

The utter failure of

representation in effect abolishes the attorney-client
relationship.
there cited.

64 ALR 4th 323, § 2, footnotes 19-20 and cases
Since the application of one of the exceptions to

the general rule usually involves questions of fact regarding the
nature of counsel's conduct, the trial judge has great
discretion.

See Harris v. Tillev (197) 25 U.2d 260, 480 P2d 132,

64 ALR4th 323 at § 20[b].
Even after trial, where it is determined that the lawyer
utterly failed to provide adequate representation, and his
client's substantive rights were adversely affected by palpable
attorney malfeasance, a new trial has been allowed.

Garrett v.

Osborn, 164 Colo 31, 431 P2d 1012. If a client's rights have
been wantonly or inadvertently jeopardized or lost by counsel, as
in a complete failure to appear, the court may afford relief by
granting a new trial in a civil case. Nordensson v. Nordensson
(App) 146 Ariz 544, 707 P2d 948, later app 152 Ariz 438, 733 P2d
635.

A litigant who employs counsel and communicates the merit

of the case may reasonably rely on that counsel, and counsel's
negligence will not be imputed to the litigant without ample
notice either of counsel's negligence or of the need for personal
action.

Thelen v. Thelen, 53 NC App 684, 281 SE2d 737.

Utah allows relief for extreme misconduct by counsel.

The

following Utah cases have discussed incompetence of counsel as a
ground for relief from a judgment:
(a)

In 1979 the Utah Court commented that alleged

incompetence of counsel, based on differing theories and
7

assumptions, is not grounds for relief.

In Maltbv v. Cox, (Utah

1979) 598 P.2d 336 the Utah Supreme Court refused to reverse
denial of a motion for a new trial based on allegedly incompetent
trial counsel, because present counsel disagreed with the
theories and assumptions of the former attorney who had tried an
automobile accident case.

The court said the plaintiff had now

shown that the jury's verdict would have been different had the
alternative theories been followed, and denied relief.
In dicta in the Maltbv case, the main opinion by Justice
Wilkins (Justice Maughn concurring) made the general comment that
while incompetence of counsel in a criminal case might be grounds
for a new trial, so far as they had determined the Utah Supreme
Court had never granted relief on such grounds in a civil case.
(b) Concurring opinion allows relief where process has gone
awry in civil cases. Crockett's concurrence in Maltbv v. Coxf
(Utah 1979) 598 P. 2d 336 (joined by Hall and Stewart, J.)
objected to that broad language and commented as follows:
At P. 341:
The purpose of all court proceedings is, of course, to do
justice. If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an
injustice has resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or
this Court on review, should rectify such an unfortunate
occurrence, whether the proceeding is criminal or civil.
(emphasis added).
At P. 342:
[I]ncompetence or negligence of counsel which appears to
have resulted in an injustice will justify the granting of a
new trial (citing Garrett v. Osborn, 164 Colo. 31, 431 P.2d
1012 (1968). It is therefore my view that in determining
whether relief should be granted the matter of critical
concern should not be as to the nature of the proceeding,
but whether there is such a strong likelihood that an

8

injustice had resulted (id. at 1013) that good conscience
requires it to be remedied." (emphasis added).
Judgment deprives Morse and Transamerica Equities of due
process of law.

Under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

and Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution, he may not be deprived
of property without "due process of law".
Strong public policy favors hearing the case on the merits.
If URCP 60(b)(1) excusable neglect standard were applicable (it
is not) still Morse has met that standard.

Some rules announced

in cases that have discussed circumstance which justify relief
from a default judgment include the following:
(a) Liberal in granting of trial on merits. Courts should
be liberal and somewhat indulgent in granting relief against
judgments taken by default to end that controversies may be tried
on merits. Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979); Baird v.
Intermountain School Federal credit Union, 55 P.2d 877 (Utah
1976); McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d
129, 17 U.2d 323 (1966); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589
P.2d 767 (Utah 1978)
(c) A 1982 medical malpractice case reaffirmed Justice
Maugn's concurring opinion in Maltbv.

In Jennings v. Stoker, 652

P.2d 912 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court refused to reverse a
verdict based on alleged trial attorney incompetence because: (A)
a motion for a new trial had not been filed, (B) mere differences
in theory of trial techniques are not sufficient to grant a new
trial, and (C) the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that there
was a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been
9

different.

The court cited with approval 58 Am. Jur. 2d New

Trial § 160 & 66 CJS New Trial § 82b, and cited with approval
Justice Maugn's concurring opinion in Maltbv v. Cox, 598 P.2d 336
[quoted in paragraph 24(b) above].

At page 913 the Utah Supreme

Court commented in part as follows:
"The general rule is that in civil cases a new trial will
not be granted based upon the incompetence or negligence of
one's own trial counsel. There are cases which recognize
that under exigent or exceptional circumstances,
the court may justify in granting a new trial. Maltby v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 336, see the concurring opinion by Chief
Justice Crockett which is concurred in by two other
justices; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 160 & 66 CJS New Trial
§ 82b." (emphasis added)
(d) Supreme Court reversed denial of motion to vacate
default judgment entered as sanction for tardiness of attorney.
In McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah
1966), defendant's attorney was 27 minutes late for trial.

The

court scheduled trial on short notice, and counsel objected
because witnesses were unavailable.

The morning of trial counsel

sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court.
Unsuccessful, he called the Court and advised what he was doing
and that he would be late.

Because of his absence the Court

entered default of his client and proceeded to hear evidence.
The trial court refused to permit the attorney after he arrived
late) to participate meaningfully in those proceedings, and
entered a default judgment.

New counsel moved to vacate that

default, which was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court

reversed and in part stated as follows:
It is policy of law to favor trial on merits and to afford
both sides full opportunity to present their evidence and
10

contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of
on substantial rather than upon technical grounds.
(emphasis added).
Courts should exercise caution in regard to default
judgments and should be somewhat indulgent if setting such
judgments aside. (emphasis added).
"In order to achieve the objectives just stated it is
sometimes necessary to look beyond what appear to be illadvised, or even irritating or contemptuous conduct of
counsel to the adjudication of the rights of the parties to
the action. It should be kept in mind that their rights and
any such misconduct of counsel are separate and distinct
things which should be dealt with separately.11 The purpose
of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when
defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. • .
it was never intended to be used as a means of disciplining
attorneys who may be derelict in the performance of their
duties. If such a course were followed it may do a grave
injustice to the client by punishing him rather than the
attorney who has done the wrong." (emphasis added).
At p. 131 the Court stated, "We are acquainted with no
foundation in law, either statutory or decisional, which
would justify the entering of a default judgment and
preventing the defendants from participating in a trial
under circumstances shown here." (Court cited Hovey v.
Elliott, et al. 167 US 490, 17 S Ct 8412, 43 LEd 215 and 14
ALR2d 580, et seq. re impropriety of striking pleading and
entering default to punish contempt). (emphasis added).
(See discussion in paragraph 23(a) above)•
The sanction of a default judgment should not be imposed
upon Morse and Transamerica Equities because of misfeasance of
his attorney if such might be found.

As noted by the Court in

McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, supra, where defendants
have raised issues by their pleading, they should not be punished
by suffering a default judgment as a result of misconduct of
their attorney.
Reasonable excuse.

It is generally an abuse of discretion

to refuse to vacate judgment where there is reasonable
justification or excuse and timely application is made to set it
11

aside.

See Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P.

2d 316; Board of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 384
P.2d 806, 14 U.2d 385 (Utah 1963).

The Court should be indulgent

toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they
can be resolved in conformity with law and justice.

See Mavhew

v. Standard Gilsonite, 376 P.2d 951, 14 U. 2d 52; Social Service
v. Musselman# 667 P.2d 951, 14 U. 2d 52; Social Service v.
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053.
Policy favors trial on merits.

The law tends to accord to

litigants the chance for a hearing on the merits where it can be
done without serious injustice to the other party.

Courts are

generally indulgent toward setting aside default judgments if
there is reasonable justification or excuse and timely
application is made.

See Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla

Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980);
Doubt should be resolved in favor of vacating judgment.

If

there it is unclear whether a default should be set aside, the
law favors doing so.

Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla

Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369.
Under the circumstances in this situation before the Court,
the Judgment should be set aside.
Defendants' attorney Grant Orton, had been called up on
military duty for certain periods of time during the Gulf War
Crisis.

He established certain criteria to oversee his legal

responsibilities during that period of time.

His secretary was

to pick up the mail or the post office was to hold his mail.
12

He

would periodically check his mail and take care of the problems
shown there.

Nothing came to him in the mail in reference to the

motions for sanctions and motions for judgment.

He thought

everything was taken care of.
And so it was with considerable surprise that he found his
client had been served with a Supplemental Order upon a Judgment
that he had no knowledge of.

He tried to take care of the client

by filing a Motion To Set Aside was again activated by the
military and therefore requested new counsel to file the Motion
and to pursue the Setting Aside Of The Judgment.

This was done

in a timely fashion but was denied by the District Court.
Conclusion
Justice clearly calls for a reversal of the lower court's
denial or Defendants' Motion To Set Aside Its Judgment.

Based

upon rule 55 and 60(b) the District Court should be instructed to
set aside the Order For Sanctions And Judgment and allow the case
to be set for trial.
Respectfully so requested this 9th day/of March, 19#2

WESLEY F. SII
Attorney at Law
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, I hand
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to the following:
J. Bruce Reading
Marlon L. Bates
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite f200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT I

FILED
OlS'lP.'.OT COURT

JAN IB 3 5^ PH.'91
THIRD JUDiCiAL CiSTHlCT
C A I T l AKP .-.aiJKTY

J. BRUCE READING
MARLON L. BATES , #4794*
^0EP7TY
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

CLERK

^ ^ X l / ^ ^ F ^ ^ V
UPON
SANDY PHECJtlCI.SAJ

COUNTY. UTAH

DEPUTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SUMMONS
(Twenty Day)

KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
-TRANSAMERIGA EQUITIES, INC.*

Civil No. g

Defendants.
THE

STATE

OF

UTAH

lO")C>OO(flCJ0

Judge W<7fa 5C^I

TO THE ABOVE-NAMED

DEFENDANT,

TRANSAMERICA

EQUITIES, INC.:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in
writing to the attached complaint with the clerk of the aboveentitled District Court, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and to serve upon, or mail to Marlon L. Bates of Scalley &
Reading, plaintiff's attorney, 261 East 300 South, Suite 200, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer, within twenty (20)
days after service of this summons upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for relief demanded in said complaint, which has been
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE2.SUM

(J*^

f. Arf-M^ i^-

iA

-

'

iff

H0O Co //Y00 £

filed with the Clerk of the Court and a copy of which is hereto
annexed and herewith served upon you.
DATED this

day of January, 1991.

Marloji L. Bates
Attorney for Plaintiff
Serve Defendant:
Transamerica Equities, Inc.
c/o Clare T. Morse, President and Registered Agent
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107

C:\MLB\PLEADING\M0RSE2.SUM
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J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

Civil No. *[ i n^ooaC-JhCk)

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.
Plaintiff,

:
Kendrick

Judge
Brothers

\k/'Aicif\<>or\
Construction,

Inc.

(hereinafter "Kendrick"), for cause of action against defendants,
Clare T. Morse (hereinafter "Morse") and Transamerica Equities,
Inc. (hereinafter "TEI"), asserts as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Kendrick

is

a Utah corporation

with

principal

offices located in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
2.

Morse is an individual who upon information and

belief is a resident of Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
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TEI,

upon

information

and

belief,

is

a

Utah

corporation with principal offices located in Salt Lake County,
state of Utah.
4.

The activities upon which this action is based

occurred in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
5.

On or about April 18, 1990, TEI and Morse entered

into a joint venture agreement (hereinafter "the Agreement") with
Kendrick wherein Kendrick would pay a Fifty Thousand and No/100
Dollar ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee to obtain financing for the
purchase

and improvement

of certain commercial

real property

located in Salt Lake County, state of Utah (hereinafter "the
Venture"). A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit
A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
6.
Agreement

and

In order to induce Kendrick to enter into the
provide

the

Fifty

Thousand

and

No/100

Dollar

($50,000.00) loan commitment fee, TEI and Morse provided Kendrick
with a loan commitment letter (hereinafter the "Loan Commitment")
from John L. Gordin (hereinafter "Gordin") of Commercial Property
Mortgage

Corporation

(hereinafter

"CPMC") wherein

Gordin had

approved financing in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand and No/100 Dollars

($2,500,000.00), conditioned upon

receipt of the loan commitment fee and other conditions enumerated
within the Loan Commitment.
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.CMP

A copy of the Loan Commitment is
2

attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
7c

Kendrick confirmed with both Morse and Gordin that

all conditions precedent to fulfilling the obligation to provide
the financing had been fulfilled except the receipt of the Fifty
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee.
8.

On April 19, 1990, Kendrick wired the sum of Fifty

Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) into the account of CPMC
in reliance upon the representations of Morse and Gordin that
funding

for the Venture was approved.

A copy of the wire

confirmation is attached hereto as "Exhibit CM and incorporated
herein by this reference.
9.

Notwithstanding Gordin and CPMC's promise to provide

funding in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($2,500,000.00) for the Venture, no financing has
ever been provided.
10*

On numerous occasions from April to the present

time, Kendrick attempted to contact Morse and TEI to find out why
the financing had not been provided.

Morse and TEI refused to

discuss the matter with Kendrick and refused to return its repeated
phone calls.
11.

In an effort to recover its Fifty Thousand and

No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee, Kendrick retained
C:\MLB\PLEAOING\MORSE.CMP
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counsel in California to file an action against Gordin and CPMC.
A copy of the Complaint, Application for Prejudgment Writ of
Attachment, and Declaration of Tom Kendrick, Sr. are attached
hereto as "Exhibit D," "Exhibit E," and "Exhibit F" respectively
and incorporated herein by this reference.
12.

In response to the documents filed by Kendrick, the

Court ruled that the Loan Commitment was an agreement between CPMC
and Morse and that Kendrick was not in privity of contract with
CPMC and was not, therefore, the proper party to sue CPMC.
13.

When Kendrick learned that the California court

would not allow Kendrick to proceed against CPMC for a return of
Kendrickfs loan commitment fee, Kendrick once again attempted to
solicit Morse's and TEIfs support to enforce the Loan Commitment or
receive a return of the fee paid.

Once again, Morse and TEI

refused to respond in any manner to assist Kendrick despite
repeated telephone calls.
14.

On September 18, 1990, Kendrickfs Utah counsel,

Marlon L. Bates, contacted Morse's attorney, Grant L. Orton, to
request that Morse and TEI send a letter to CPMC and Gordin
demanding that the Venture either be funded or the commitment fee
refunded.

Mr. Orton was reminded of the fact that the Loan

Commitment was scheduled to expire on October 18, 1990, and that if
any additional documents were being requested by Gordin or CPMC,
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.CMP
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they would have to be provided before that date or the commitment
fee could become non-refundable. Mr. Orton agreed to send a letter
to Gordin's and CPMCfs attorney.

Mr. Bates transmitted to Mr.

Orton a copy of what he believed the letter should say together
with a letter summarizing the contents of the telephone call.

A

copy of the letter to Mr. Orton and the sample letter to be sent to
Gordin's and CPMC's attorney are attached hereto as "Exhibit GH and
"Exhibit H" respectfully and are incorporated herein by this
reference.
15.

From September 24, 1990 through November 29, 1990,

a series of letters were sent among Kendrickfs counsel, Morse's
counsel, and CPMC's counsel which collectively illustrate that
Kendrick did everything possible to solicit the assistance of Morse
and TEI (who were in privity of contract with CPMC) to join
Kendrick in persuading CPMC to refund the Fifty Thousand and No/100
Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee or finance the Venture as
promised:
a.

Letter

dated

September

24,

1990,

from

Kendrickfs counsel to Morse's counsel requesting that the letter
promised on September 18 be sent out immediately because the
October 18, 1990 expiration date of the Loan Commitment was drawing
closer.

A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit I"

and incorporated herein by this reference.
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.CMP

5

b.

Letter

dated

September

25,

1990,

from

Kendrick's counsel to Morse's counsel requesting once again that
the letter be sent immediately.

A copy of such letter is attached

hereto as "Exhibit JH and incorporated herein by this reference.
c.

Letter dated October 1, 1990, from Kendrick's

counsel to Gordin's and CPMC's counsel in California demanding
information regarding what, if anything, was preventing the funding
of the Venture or demanding a return of the loan commitment fee.
A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit K," and
incorporated herein by this reference.
d.

Letter dated October

1, 1990 from Morse's

counsel to CPMC's counsel in California requesting information as
to why the Venture had not been financed as promised.

(Kendrick's

counsel did not receive a copy of this letter until one week after
it was sent.) A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit
L" and incorporated herein by this reference.
e.

Letter dated October 4, 1990, from Kendrick's

counsel to Morse's counsel demanding once again that the letter
promised on September 18 be sent out immediately in order to meet
the October 18, 1990 expiration date of the Loan Commitment.
copy of

such

letter is attached

hereto

incorporated herein by this reference.
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as

A

"Exhibit M" and

f.

Letter dated October 5, 1990, from Morse's

counsel to Kendrick's counsel explaining that he did send out the
promised letter on October 1, 1990 and enclosing a copy of the
October 1, 1990 letter for Kendrick's counsel.
g.

Letter dated October 12, 1990, from Gordin's

and CPMC's counsel in California to Kendrick's counsel stating that
additional information was necessary to conclude the financing of
the Venture and that such information had already been requested of
Morse, who was CPMC's customer.

The letter further refused to

refund the loan commitment fee and made reference to a letter dated
September 4, 1990 from CPMC's counsel to Kendrick's California
counsel which stated that Kendrick had nothing to do with the
financing of the Venture because CPMC's Loan Commitment was to
Morse and TEI and not to Kendrick. A copy of the October 12, 1990
letter is attached as "Exhibit 0 H and incorporated herein by this
reference.

A copy of the September 4, 1990 letter is attached

hereto as "Exhibit PH and incorporated herein by this reference.
h.

Letter dated October 16, 1990 from Kendrick's

counsel to Morse's counsel transmitting copies of the two letters
sent by Gordin's and CPMC's counsel and requesting verification of
the

statement

that

CPMC

had,

indeed,

previously

requested

additional information from Morse in order to finance the Venture.
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A copy of such letter is attached hereto as

M

Exhibit Q" and

incorporated herein by this reference.
i.

Letter dated November 29, 1990, from Kendrickf s

counsel to Morse's counsel referencing a telephone conversation
between the two attorneys three weeks before in which Morse's
attorney confirmed that Morse had received a letter from CPMC
requesting additional information in order to finance the Venture
and promised to transmit the letter to Kendrick's counsel upon
receipt of the letter from Morse.

A copy of such letter is

attached hereto as "Exhibit R" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
16.

In addition to the correspondence described above,

Morse's attorney disclosed to Kendrick*s attorney in a telephone
conversation on November 1, 1990, that Morse and CPMC were working
together on a second project which Gordin and CPMC had also
promised to finance. According to Morse's attorney, Morse would do
nothing to help Kendrick either recover its commitment fee or force
CPMC to finance the Venture until the second project which Morse
had with CPMC was fully funded.

Morse's attorney stated that he

did not know how long it would take to conclude the second
transaction between Morse and CPMC.
17.

As of the date of this Complaint, Morse and TEI: (i)

have not provided Kendrick with information regarding what CPMC has
C:\MLB\PLEADING\M0RSE.CMP
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requested in order to finance the Venture although Morse has had
that information for quite some time now, (ii) have not indicated
whether such information has been provided to CPMC, and (iii) have
not informed Kendrick about when Morse's second project with CPMC
would be completely funded, and (iv) have not told Kendrick why the
Venture was subordinated to the second project between Morse and
CPMC*

Additionally, Morse has declined Kendrick1s request to join

Kendrick in an action against CPMC to force the promised financing
or to refund the commitment fee even though Kendrick has promised
to pay all attorney's fees associated therewith.

Indeed, with the

sole exception of one letter sent by Morse's counsel to CPMC's
attorney after repeated demands by Kendrickfs counsel, Morse and
TEI have done nothing to support Kendrick's efforts to conclude the
financing for the Venture or receive a refund of its Fifty Thousand
and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) commitment fee even though Morse
and TEI were aware of the damages their inaction would cause
Kendrick.
COUNT I (Breach of Fiduciary Duty)
18.

Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs 1-17 above.
19.

Morse

and

TEI

have

materially

breached

their

fiduciary duty to their joint venturer, Kendrick, by failing to
exercise loyalty to the joint concern and by failing to show the
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.CMP

9

utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealing with
Kendrick.
20.

Morse and TEI have failed to follow through on

efforts to conclude the financing, have refused to assist Kendrick
in bringing an action against CPMC for wrongfully failing to
finance the Venture or return the commitment fee, and have placed
the interests of a second transaction with CPMC above the interests
of the joint venture, to the detriment of the joint venture.
21.

As a direct and proximate result of this breach of

fiduciary duty, Kendrick has incurred damages in the amount of
Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost
on the joint venture in an amount to be established upon the
evidence at trial.
COUNT II (Breach of Implied Covenant
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
22.

Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs 1-21 above.
23.

Morse and TEI have materially breached their implied

covenant to Kendrick of good faith and fair dealing by failing to
assist Kendrick in completing the financing for the Venture or
receiving a refund of its commitment

fee, and by placing the

interests of a second transaction with CPMC above the interest of
the joint venture to the detriment of the joint venture.
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24.

As a direct and proximate result of this breach of

an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Kendrick has
incurred damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($50,000.00), plus profits lost on the joint venture in an amount
to be established upon the evidence at trial.
COUNT III (Negligence)
25.

Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs 1-24 above.
26.

Morse and TEI had a duty to use reasonable care to

provide all information required by CPMC in a timely manner in
order to facilitate the funding of the Venture.
27.

Morse and TEI materially breached their duty by

failing to provide in a timely manner information requested by CPMC
to conclude the financing of the Venture.
28.

As a direct and proximate result of the failure of

Morse and TEI to fulfill their duty to provide said information,
Kendrick has been damaged in the amount of Fifty Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost in the joint venture
in an amount to be established upon the information.
COUNT IV (Fraud)
29.

Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all

allegations contained in paragraphs 1-28 above.
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30.

Morse and TEI fraudulently conspired with Gordin and

CPMC to withhold their support of Kendrick?s efforts to protect the
interests of the joint venture in exchange for Gordinfs and CPMC's
efforts to finance a second transaction on behalf of Morse and TEI.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of this fraudulent

activity, Kendrick has been damaged in the amount of Fifty Thousand
and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost on the joint
venture in an amount to be established upon the evidence at trial.
WHEREFORE, Kendrick prays for relief as follows:
1.

As to COUNT I, COUNT II, and COUNT III, Kendrick

prays for judgment against defendants in the amount of Fifty
Thousand

and No/100 Dollars

($50,000.00), together with lost

profits of the joint venture in an amount to be established upon
the evidence at trial, prejudgment interest at the legal rate,
court costs, and attorney's fees incurred herein.
2.

As to COUNT IV, Kendrick prays for judgment against

defendants in the amount of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars
($50,000.00), together with lost profits of the joint venture in an
amount to be established upon evidence at trial, punitive damages,
prejudgment interest at the legal rate, court costs, and attorney's
fees incurred herein.
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3.

For such other and further relief as this Court

deems just and equitable in the premises.
DATED this lf/{

day of January, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

Plaintiff's Address:
4015 South 300 West
Murray, Utah 84107

C: \MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.CMP
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Attorney for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT I I

J:HI3
Grant G Orton #2482
Attorney for Defendants
2670 Soutn 2000 East
8ait Lake City, Utan &4109
Teiepnone: (aOl) 465-7S37
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IN TMK THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATK OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHEKS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

J
A N S W E R

Plaintiff,

Civil No.

vs
CLARE T. HORSE and
TKANSAHERXCA EQUITIES, INC.
Defendants.

])

Judge

91090006SCN

Homer Wilkinson

)

COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney, Grant G
Orton, ana in response to the allegations of plaintiff8s complaint
answer, aver and allege as follows:
1. Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against these
defendants, individually and collectively, upon which relief can be
granted.
2. Defendants admit tne allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 9, 11, 12, 15 and 2b of plaintiff's complaint.
2.

Defendants admit that defendant Transamerica Equities,

Inc. provided KendricK with a copy of a loan commitment letter from
Commercial Property Mortgage Corporation wherein CPMC approved
financing in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand and
No/iOo Dollars ($2,5o0,oo0.0o), conditioned upon receipt of the
loan commitment fee and other conditions enumerated within the Loan
commitment; allege tnat said copy was given to plaintiff at its

request and nor in an attempt to induce plaintiff to provide any
funds to defendants or either of them, and deny each and every
other allegation of paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint.
3.

Defendants deny that plaintiff confirmed with Morse

tnat all conditions precedent to fulfilling the obligation to
provide the financing nad been fulfilled except the receipt of the
Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee;
ana are without sufficient information or knowledge to form a
Deiier as to the truth or falsity of the balance of the allegations
of paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint and therefore deny the
same.
4.

Defendants allege that plaintiff represented to each of

them that plaintiff had wired the sum of Fifty Thousand and No/100
Dollars into the account of CPMC; have no independant knowledge
that this did in fact occur; submit that Exhibit "C" of plaintiff's
complaint does not show the owner of the account into which
plaintiff's funds are alleged to have been transferred; but assume
tnat said sum was transferred to CPMC by its subsequent actions,
and therefore admit the allegations of paragraph 8 of plaintiff's
complaint.
5. Defendants admit that on numerous occasions from April to
the present time, Kendrick attempted to contact Morse and TEI to
find out why the financing had not been provided, but allege that
Morse, on behalf of TEI as its President, returned calls on
numerous occasions when he was told of calls being made by
plaintiff, and therefore deny the balance of the allegations of
paragraph 10 of plaintiff*s complaint inconsistent herewith.

6.

Detenaants allege that after Kendrick notified them that

the California court haa dismissed plaintiff's case against CPMC,
plaintiff attempted to solicit Morse's and TEI's support to enforce
the Loan Commitment or receive a return of the fee paid, that,
Morse, as President of TEI, spoke to CPMC about the matter on
several occasions and authorized corporate counsel to communicate
tne corporation's concerns to CPMC, that to this date CPMC has
advised TEI that it is proceeding with the financing package for
tne proDect, that items may still be required which are unknown at
the present time due to the unavailability of certain documents
oecause of the takeover of the owner of the project by the RTC, and
tne lack of cooperation of the RTC's predecessor in interest; and
deny ail allegations of paragraph 13 of plaintiff's complaint
inconsistent herewith.
7c

Defendants admit that on September 18, 1990, Kendrick's

Utah Counsel, Marlon L. Bates, contacted Morse's attorney, Grant G
urton, to request that Morse and TEI send a letter to CPMC and
Gordin demanding that the Venture either be funded or the
commitment fee refunded; and that Mr. Orton was told that the loan
Commitment was scheduled to expire on October 18, 1990, and that if
any aaaitional documents were being requested by Gordin or CPMC,
they would have to be provided before that date or the commitment
fee could become non-refundable; allege that Mr. Orton could not
send any such letter to Gordin and CPMC's attorney without an
autnorization to do so; allege that the sample letter which
plaintiff proposed to send is immaterial and has no bearing on tnis
matter at all, oecause such a letter in any event would have to

approved by TEI, but do admit that copies of Exhibit "G" and
Exhioit "H" were sent to defendants' counsel; and deny all other
allegations of paragraph 14 inconsistent herewith.
8.

Defendants admit that defendants' attorney disclosed to

Kendrick's attorney in a telephone conversation on November 1,
1^90, that Morse and CPMC were working together on a another
project which CPMC had also promised to finance. Defendants deny
that defendants' attorney said that Morse would do nothing to help
KendricK either recover its commitment fee or force CPMC to finance
the Venture until the second project which Morse had with CPMC was
fully funded; but allege that Morse's attorney rather indicated to
plaintiff's attorney that it was his understanding that CPMC would
not rinance the subject project until the first project was done,
and that Morse's attorney did not know how long it would take to
conclude the first transaction which was brokered by Morse to CPMC;
and deny all other allegations of paragraph 16 inconsistent
herewith.
*.

Defendants admit that Morse has declined Kendrick's

request to join Kendrick in an action against CPMC to force the
promised financing or to refund the commitment fee; allege that
Morse, as President of TEI, is convinced that it is CPMCs intent
to fund the project, and that to file such a suit at this time
could jeopardize the funding of the project because TEI has been
intormed by CPMC that estoppel letters from tenants are required,
wnich TEI has been unable to obtain from the present fee owner, and
nas oeen forced to file a suit in federal court to force the sale
or tne project and to provide necessary documents to complete the

tunamg; and furthermore allege that plaintiff has been told of
c m s prooiem; allege tnat rhe financing on rhe other project which
was broKered oy worse, has nothing to do with this matter, otner
m a n the tact that as a matter of funding priority it is TEI's
understanding that said project will be funded before the suo^ect
project, and therefore that no information on said project has been
provided to plaintitt, ano deny all other allegations of
plamtirf's paragraph 17 inconsistent herewith,
10. Derendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 19, 21, 23,
24, 27, 2a and 30 of plaintiff's complaint.
11.

in response to paragraphs 18, 22, 25 and 29 of

piamtirr's complaint, defendants hereoy incorporate by reference
their responses to all other allegations of plaintiff contained
herein.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
12. At all times pursuant hereto, defendant, Clare T. Morse
("Morse"), was an officer in defendant corporation, Transamerxca
Equities, Inc., was acting solely for said corporation, and is not
personally liaole for the acts of the said corporation.
13. There is no contractural relationship between plaintiff
and defendant, Clare T. Morse.
14. The copy of the subject Doint venture agreement, attached
to plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit "A", is not a true and correct
copy in tnat tne original document bears interlineations on page 1
eliminating all references to Clare T. Morse.
15.

fiamtitt's complaint fails to name an mdespensible

party, i.e. Commercial Property Mortgage Corporation.

WHEREFORE, these defendants pray for dismissal of this action
togetner with costs and attorneys1 fees necessarily incurred in
their defense, and for sucn other and further relief as the court
may deem just and proper•
DATED this 11th day of J

Attorney for Defendants
MAILING CERTIFICATE
i certity tnat I aid send a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ANSWER, postage prepaia, to plaintiff's attorneys, J.
Bruce Reading ana Marlon L. Bates at SCALLEY £ READING, 261 East
JUU soutn, suite 200; Salt Lake City, Utah/84111 this
January, ld9I.

* J *day of
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BY

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND
AWARD DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES"

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil NO.910900069CN
:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

COMES now the plaintiff, by and through counsel, and
moves this Court for an order striking defendants' answer and
awarding default judgment as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint,
together with attorney's fees incurred in bringing the Motion to
Compel and this Motion to Strike.

This motion is brought in

accordance with Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
based upon the defendants' failure to produce discovery within 15
days of the Court's minute entry dated April 5, 1991. This motion
is

supported

by

C: \MLB\PLEADING\MORSE. STR

the

accompanying

Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities and the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, counsel for the
plaintiff.
DATED this cS

day of April, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

tfaflbn L, B a t e s \ J
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

j^j

day of April, 1991,

I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion to Strike Answer and Award Default Judgment and Attorney's
Fees to the following:
Grant G. Orton, Esq.
2670 South 2000 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

JJjtyinifclcuMdl
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EXHIBIT IV

WESLEY F. SINE (2967)
Attorney for Defendants
349 South 200 East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-i>125

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DEFENDANTS TRANSAMERICA
EQUITIES AND CLARE T. MORSE'S
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SANCTIONS
AND JUDGMENT
Civil No.: 9109.0069CN

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

JUDGE: WILKINSON

Defendants.
DEFENDANTS Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. Morse
nereby move the Court pursuant to rules 55(c) and 60(b) Utah
R. Civ. P., to set aside the Judgment Certificate and Sanctions
in favor of Plaintiff against Transamerica Equities, Inc.
and filed the 3rd day of June, 1991.
The grounds for this Motion and the facts support the
same are more particularly set forth in the Affidavits and
Memorandum in support hereof that are filed herewith.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 1991.

WESLEY F.
Attorney for Defendants

EXHIBIT V

WESLEY t\ SINE [Z3*>1)
Attorney tor Defendants
34y South ZVQ East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111
Telephone: (801) Jb4-b12b

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,
Flaintitf,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT
Civil N O . :
JUDGE:

I.

yioyuOObyCN -

WILKINSON

INTRODUCTION

This Memorandum is submitted to the provision of Rule
4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, in support
of Defendants Grant G. Orton and Clare T. Morse's Motion
To Set Aside Judgment and Sanctions filed by Plaintiff and
served herewith.
II.

STATEMENT OF" MATERIAL FACTS^

The record now before the court establishes the following
facts that are material to Plaintiff's Motion:
1.

In response to service of the Summons and Complaint

in the above matter upon the defendants Transamerica Equities
Inc. and Clare T. Morse, an answer was filed and served by
mail on behalf of Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T.

Morse on or about January 11 , 1991.
2.

On July 10, 1991 Clare T. Morse and Transamerica

Equities, Inc. learned for the first time that a Judgment
had been obtained against Transamerica Equities, Inc. and
Clare T. Morse in the instant matter when they were personally
served by constable with a Motion and Order in Supplemental
Proceedings.
3.

Their attorney, Grant Orton was out of town on a

military call up.

Upon reviewing the files and inquiring

into this matter with Grant Orton, it was found that he had
never received notice of plaintiff's judgment nor of the
Motion apparently filed preliminary to the granting of
judgment.
4.

The mail to Grant Orton1s office is delivered to

a mail box in front of the building where his office is
located.

During the months of January through May 1991,

Grant Orton had numerous military assignments outside of
the State of Utah, and during that time the mail has been
retained on occasion by the Postal Service when his parttime secretary has not picked it up in a timely fashion.
5.

In the past when, this happened, it has been retained

by the post office for it to be picked up there.' Upon
checking with the post office Grant Orton: found:that this
was not the case since there is no such mail retained by
the Postal Service*
6.

Had Grant Orton become aware from any source that
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a Motion preliminary to the granting of judgment and sanctions
had been served in any manner, including by mail, he would
have taken the action necessary to timely prepare, file and
serve an appropriate response thereto and he would not have
permitted or suffered any judgment or sanctions to have been
entered against the Defendant herein, without his answering
said motions*
7.

Defendants have, hold and claim valid and

meritorious defenses to each of the claims and issues that
are raised in and that are the subject of the Complaint and
has asserted them in his Answer.
8.

Defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc. nor Clare

T. Morse did not receive notice of the Motion for Sanctions
and Judgment.
9.

Defendants did not receive Notice of Plaintiffs'

Motions nor could they find those notices.
10.

That Grant Orton was attorney for Defendant Clare

T. Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. and all defenses
for Transamerica Equities included Morse.
11o

That Clare Morse did not receive notice of any

of Plaintiff's notices.
12.

Defendants Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities

did not have notice of any of the lack of response and
therefore were dependent upon their attorney to represent
them in this matter.

-3-

13.

That at the very most, this was caused by excusable

neglect.
III.

ARGUMENT

Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., provide for
relief from the entry of defaults and default judgments "for
good cause shown" and for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect".

The applicable standard is stated

as follows in Westinqhouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975)
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep
them up-to-date. But- it is even more important to keep
in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts
is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and
to do justice between them. In conformity with that
principle, the courts generally tend to favor granting
relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.The facts established by the record now before the Court
clearly satisfy the requirements of Rule 55(c) and 60(b) and
compel the granting of the relief sought by Defendant's Motion.
The failure of Defendants to file and serve a timely and
appropriate response to the Motions for Sanctions and Judgment
Drought
the mail

by the Plaintiff was caused

by problems both with

(Orton nor Morse received

the notices), and with

Grant Orton serving military duty during the war in Kuwaitt
during January - May 1991.

The failure was not the result

of poor practices, carelessness, or lack of concern on the
part

of Defendants, but rather a problem with the mail in

-4-

part caused by Defendant Orton being called up in the military
during this period.

Moreover, defendants have, hold and claim,

and are fully prepared to assert, good and meritorious defenses
to each of the claims and issues that are raised by and that
are the subject of the Plaintiff's Complaint.
IV*
For

the

reasons

stated

CONCLUSION
above

Defendant's

Motion

should

be granted*
DATED

this 3 / ^ d a y of August, 1991.

'frfiSLEY F. SINE/
Attorney for Defendants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT
JUDGMENT was served upon the following named individuals by
mailing a copy thereof to said individuals, postage pre-paid,
at the address shown below:
J. Bruce Reading,
Marlon L. Bates,
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah-84111
Savantha Lane

-5-

EXHIBIT V I

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET
ASIDE SANCTIONS AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No.910900069CN
:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

I. INTRODUCTION
This Court properly responded to the defendants' long
history of complete disregard for this case by striking defendants'
answer and entering judgment against defendants.

Now, over seven

months after defendants abandoned this matter, they believe they
have the right to start over again by setting aside the judgment
which was properly entered.
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
A chronology of material facts in this case establishes
an inexcusable pattern of total neglect:
C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP

1.

On January 18, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent a

Request for Production of Documents to Grant G. Orton, the attorney
for defendants.

The mailing

certificate

indicates that the

document was properly mailed to the address which Mr. Orton uses
for his practice of law. The document was not returned by the post
office.
2.

On February 22, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent Mr.

Orton a letter reminding him that the time to answer the Request
for Production of Documents had now passed and granting Mr. Orton
an extension of time until March 1, 1991 to respond to the Request.
Mr. Orton was duly advised that if he failed to respond on or
before March 1, 1991, a motion to compel would be brought and
sanctions would be requested.

The letter was correctly mailed to

Mr. Ortonfs business address- and was not'returned by tha- post
office.

A copy of the letter is attached as "Exhibit A" and

incorporated herein by this reference.
3.

On March 5, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a

Motion to Compel Production of Documents and asked the Court to
award attorney's fees associated with bringing the motion because
of defendants complete lack of response. This motion was also duly
mailed to defendants' counsel and was not returned by the post
office.

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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4.

On April 1, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed with

the Court and duly mailed to defendants' attorney a Notice to
Submit for Decision«

This document was also not returned by the

post office.
5.

On April 5, 1991, the Court granted plaintiff's

motion and ordered defendants to respond to the Request for
Production of Documents within fifteen (15) days of April 5, 1991.
The Court held in reserve the issue of awarding attorney's fees.
The Court's Minute Entry was duly mailed to defendants' attorney at
the same address to which plaintiff's attorney had been sending
correspondence.
6.
counsel

On April 18, 1991, Mr. Orton telephoned plaintiff's

to apologize

for neglecting

the matter.

Mr. Orton

acknowledged that he recei^ed-the--Court*s Minute.-Entry—and—the
previous documents but had been too busy to get with Mr. Morse.
Mr. Orton said that he told Mr. Morse about the Request for
Production of Documents but he did not think Mr. Morse had done
anything yet to assemble documents.
additional

time and plaintiff's

Mr. Orton then requested

attorney denied

the request,

reminding Mr. Orton that he already been given three months to
respond.
Request

Finally, Mr. Orton said that he could not locate the
for Production of Documents and asked if plaintiff's

attorney would send him a new set. Plaintiff's attorney offered to
C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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fax the document to Mr. Or ton so that he could have it immediately.
As soon as the telephone conversation ended, plaintiff's counsel
faxed the Request for Production of Documents to Mr. Orton. A copy
of the fax transmittal sheet is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and
incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the April client
billing which further proves that Mr. Morse spoke directly with
plaintiff's attorney and was denied any extension of time is
attached hereto as "Exhibit C" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
7.
Motion

to

On April 23, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a

Strike

Answer,

Enter

Default

Judgment

and

Award

Attorney's Fees because of defendants' failure to respond in any
manner within the time period ordered by the Court. A copy of this
motion was duly mailed to Mr. Orton and was not returned by the
post office.
8.

On May 7, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a Notice

to Submit and duly mailed a copy to Mr. Orton. The mailing was not
returned by the post office.
9.

On May 21, 1991, the Court prepared a Minute Entry

granting plaintiff's Motion to Strike Answer, Enter Default and
Award Attorney's Fees. Once again, the Court properly sent a copy
of the Minute Entry to Mr. Orton.

C:\MLB\PLKADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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10.

On May 30, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent to Mr.

Orton a copy of the proposed Order Striking Answer and Awarding
Default Judgment and Attorney's Fees.
11.

On June 3, 1991, the Court signed the proposed

12.

On June 13, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served

order.

by

a constable with two Motions

Proceedings.

and Orders

in Supplemental

One was served upon him in his capacity as the

registered agent of Transamerica Equities, Inc., and the second was
served upon him in his individual capacity.

These motions fully

explained on their face that judgment had been entered against both
defendants in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and
No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00). Copies of these motions together with
the constable's return of service.affidavits are attached^heretozas^
"Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E" and are incorporated herein by this
reference.
13.

Clare Morse did not show up at the hearing which was

scheduled for June 30, 1991.
14.

On July 10, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served

by a constable for a second time with two Motions and Orders in
Supplemental Proceedings.

Copies of these two documents together

with the constable's return of service affidavits are attached

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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hereto as "Exhibit F" and "Exhibit G" and are incorporated herein
by this reference.
15.

Clare Morse did not show up at the hearing which was

scheduled for July 23, 1991.
16.

On August 6, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served

by a constable for a third time with two Orders to Show Cause.
Copies of these two documents together with the constable's return
of service affidavits are attached hereto as "Exhibit H" and
"Exhibit I" and are incorporated herein by this reference.
17.

On August 12, 1991, one day before the Order to Show

Cause hearing was scheduled, Clare Morse's new attorney, Wesley
Sine, telephoned plaintiff's attorney and notified plaintiff's
attorney

that

defendants had retained

him

to represent both

defendants and that he would be fi-ling^ & motion to Set- Aside^^the"
Default Judgment.
18.

On August 23, 1991, defendants' new attorney filed

a Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Judgment.
II. ARGUMENT
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment correctly indicates that courts generally tend to
favor granting relief from default judgments. But as the preceding
statement of material facts makes clear, this case is anything but

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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typical and the defendants' total and complete neglect of this
matter was anything but excusable.
First, defendants' Memorandum states that Clare Morse and
Transamerica

Equities first learned that a judgment had been

obtained against them on July 10, 1991 when Morse was served by a
Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings*
Memorandum).

(See paragraph 2 of

In Morse's Affidavit, Morse testifies that if he had

been aware that a motion preliminary to the granting of judgment
had been mailed, he would have taken any action to obtain new
counsel

and

respond

timely.

contradicted by the facts.

Both

of

these

statements

are

As Exhibits D and E make clear, Morse

knew a judgment had been entered against him and his company on
June 13, 1991, almost one month before he admits this knowledge and
two full months before he took-any.ac1J.Qn_1:o hire new counsel or do
anything about the judgment.

In fact, if it were not for the order

to show cause hearing and the imminent issuance of a bench warrant
for Morse's arrest, it is doubtful that any response would have
taken place even to this date.
Second, defendants' memorandum states that defendants'
attorney,

Grant

Orton,

never

received

notice

of

plaintiff's

judgment nor of the motion filed preliminary thereto (par. 3); that
had Orton been aware of such a preliminary motion, he would have
immediately responded (par. 6); that Orton was called up to serve
C:\MLB\PLEADINO\KENDRICKoOPP
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with the military from January through May, 1991 (par. 4 and third
and fourth lines from the bottom of page 4); and that Orton was
having problems with his mail from January through May of 1991
(par. 4 and 5, and last 8 lines on page 4). These statements in
the memorandum are further alleged in the Morse Affidavit which
states that Orton was on military call from January to late May of
1991 (Morse Aff., par. 5) and the Orton Affidavit which states as
follows:

Orton never had notice of the judgment or motions filed

preliminary thereto (Orton Aff., par. 3); Orton had mail problems
from January through May of 1991 (Orton Aff., par 4-5); and Orton
would have timely responded if he had been aware of motions
preliminary to the judgment (Orton Aff., par. 6).
Once again, a review of the facts contradicts each
representation made above*

In the first £lace, even -if LOrt&n-Vs-

incredible story about having mail problems for a five month period
of time is somehow accepted as truthful, it does not explain the
telephone conversation which plaintiff's attorney had with Orton on
April 18, 1991.

In that telephone conversation, Orton apologized

for neglecting to respond to the discovery, acknowledged receipt of
the Court's April 5, 1991 Minute Entry granting plaintiff's Motion
for Sanctions and requested that plaintiff's counsel grant him more
time and send again the Request

for Production of Documents

(Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, par. 3-4). If the Court questions
C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates with respect to the telephone
conversation, Exhibit B evidences a fax transmission on that date
to Orton. It should be noted that Orton has never claimed that his
fax machine was not working. Furthermore, Exhibit C evidences that
in the ordinary course of billing for this case, plaintiff's
attorney described a telephone conversation with Orton on April 18,
1991 in which plaintiff's attorney denies Orton1s request for more
time.

Exhibits B and C were prepared in April of 1991, well

before the issues raised by defendants' motion came to light.
Consequently, the validity of Exhibit B and C is much more certain
than the validity of affidavits which were prepared in anticipation
of this motion.

Exhibits B and C establish that Orton was not

completely removed from his practice of law from January through
May of 1991 as defendants' .memorandum and .affidavits -suggest;
rather, in the middle of that period, Orton is documented as having
a telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney regarding the
issues of the case and knew enough about the time frame imposed by
the Court to request an extension of time.

If Orton were placed

under oath to testify regarding his practice from February through
May of 1991, it is likely that Orton spent a substantial amount of
time practicing law.
If the facts of Ortonfs military service were to show
that after his April
C:\MLB\PLEADINO\KENDRICK.OPP

18, 1991 conversation with plaintiff's
9

attorney, Orton became too busy to practice law, Orton has a duty
to inform his client of this fact and withdraw as counsel.

Orton

did not do this. This flagrant neglect of a legal matter entrusted
to Orton is certainly not excusable within the meaning of the Rules
of Civil Procedure.

If defendants honestly believe this neglect

injured their case, their remedy is to sue their attorney for
malpractice*

The

defendants

picked

their

attorney

and the

defendants — not the plaintiff — should bear the burden of their
choice.

It is interesting to note, however, that notwithstanding

Orton*s total neglect of the case, defendants have not fired him.
Instead, they have hired new counsel to work with Orton.
In addition to Orton1s responsibility for the legal
matters entrusted to him, Orton also bears the burden of solving
any problems his legal practice has with-the delivery of his mail.
From January through May of 1991, Orton was sent at least nine
different packages of documents from plaintiff and the court.
Orton claims none of these were received by him. Certainly a mail
problem of this magnitude (if the Court believes this story) should
become apparent to any reasonable person and should be solved in
short order.

Orton's failure to do this is not excusable neglect

and plaintiff should not be forced to bear the burden of Orton*s
failure to solve his alleged mail problem.

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although Courts should generally grant motions to set
aside default judgments, this is one case where it should not be
granted*
involved

The volume of work, time, and considerable expense
in

bringing

this

particular

case

to

judgment

and

attempting to collect on that judgment takes it out of the ordinary
scope of default judgments. While the plaintiff spent thousands of
dollars jumping through a wide assortment of legal hoops and while
the

Court

patiently

granted

defendants

every

opportunity

respond, defendants' attorney knowingly neglected the case.

to
And

while the plaintiff spent additional sums attempting to collect on
the judgment, the defendants totally refused for two months to
respond to the Court's orders to attend hearings in Supplemental
Proceedings or take any action* to. set aside *he judgment.

It is

incredible that at this point, defendants are asking the Court to
pretend the last seven months never happened. To grant this motion
is to render totally ineffective the discovery process and to
penalize plaintiff for diligently pursuing its remedies in good
faith.

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.OPP
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For these reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that
defendants' motion be denied.
DATED this U. HA

day of September, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
L J ^
I hereby certify that on the _ J

day of September,

1991, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Judgment
together with the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates to the following:
Wesley Fo Sine, Esq.
647 Wc North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116^
Grant G. Orton, Esq,
2670 South 2000 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

11L
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LAW O r r t c c *

SCALLEY & R E A D I N G
F o * o 6 SCAU.CY
J . BltUCC RCAOING
STCVCN K. WALKCMMO«ST
MtCHACL W. SPCNCC
MAHLON L. BATCS
DAVIO M. CA»U»ON
SCOTT N. RASMUSSCN
Lorn NICLSCN J en* AH

A MtOrCSStOMAk COARCTATION
SUITC 2 0 0

TCIXPHONC
AACA COOC • © <
SJI-7S70

2 6 1 CAST J O O SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, U T A H

84W

fACSIMILC
AACA COOC SOI
S31-7S6S

February 22, 1991

Grant Orton, Esquire
2670 South 2000 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Re:

Kendrick Brothers Construction v. Morse and Transamerica
Equities

Dear Mr. Orton:
My records indicate that our Request for Production of
Documents was mailed to you on January 18, 1991c Consequently, I
believe the 30 days allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure have
expired. I will grant a one week extension of time to produce
these documents but if I do not receive the documents on or before
Friday, March 1, 1991, I will bring a motion to compel their
production and will request sanctions.
Sincerely,
SCALLEY & READING

Marlon L. Bates
btr
cc:

Tom Kendrick, Sr.

C: \MLB\LT*3\ORTOH5 . 0*A

L-* Ornccs

SCALLEY & R E A D I N G
FORO G. SCALLCY

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

J. BRUCE RCAOINO

Steven K.WALKCNMORST
MlCMACL W. SRENCE

TCICPHONC
A

SUITE aoo

" E A COOC « O I

*3i-r«7o
* « ' 6 A * T 3 0 0 SOOTH

MARLON U BATES

^

^

C

U T A H

a

4

m

JOMN E. HANSCN

FACSIMIIX
AREA COOC

Scorr N. RASMUSSEN

531-7900

JOHN E. SWALLOW
STCVCN B SMITH

FACSIMILE COVER LETTER
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PAGES TO:
NAME:
LOCATION:

Grant H. Orton, Esq.
3098 Highland Drive #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

FACS. NO:

(801) 487-3502

DOCUMENT(S) SENT FROM:
NAME:
LOCATION:
TEL. NO:
FACS. NO:

Marlon L. Bates, Esquire
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 531-7870
(801) 531-7968

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER LETTER: 5
DATE:
TIME:

April 18, 19914:50 p.m.

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL BACK AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS, PLEASE CONTACT: Bonnie
COMMENTS:

aoi

261 East 300 Southy sunt *w«
Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

Kendric* 8rothers Construction Co.
Attn: Ton Kendrick
4015 South 300 Uest
Murray, Utah 84107

April 30, I W l
Page 1
Clients 53014
Hatter: 08
Invoice I 4816

Matter: Cowiercul Property Mortgage Corporation

Date

Professional Services Rendered

04/18/91

Conference with opposing counsel; send sicqnd.
set of docunent request to hm and deny
additional tine to respond.
04/23/91 Conference with Tan; draft notion to strike,
nenorandun of law, and affidavit; f i l e with
court.
Total Hours

1.30

Hours

Anount

0.30

34.50

1.00

115.00

Total Services

149.50

Totals for this natter:
Prior balance

3,367,89
3,517.39

8alance due

ACCOUNT
Current

Over 30

AGING

Over 40

Interest charges at W. on accounts over 31 days.

Over 90

Total
3,517.3?

£fffa-

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

MOTION AND ORDER OF
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLAHE_JLL_MQRSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court
for an order requiring defendant, Clare T. Morse, to appear before
this Court to answer questions under oath concerning its property,
and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-exempt property
pending the hearing. Judgment_was .entered against defendant on the
date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of which Fifty
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) is
still unpaid.
DATED this

||

day of June, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

SvWan^f •
Marlbn L. Bat^s
Attorney for Plaintiff
f
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ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE:
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the
time

and

place

shown

below

to

answer

questions

under oath

concerning your property.
DATE : Thursday, June 20, 1991
TIME : 8:30 a.m.
PLACE: Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not- to sell, loan, give, away, or
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing.
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest.
DATED this

// ' day of June, 1991.
BY T
Lrcuit Court Judge
Attest Clerk of the Circuit Court

q*
Serve Defendant:
Clare T. Morse, President and Registered Agent
Transamerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107
or
Clare T, Morse
1600 West 11400 South
South Jordan, Utah 84065
C: \ML8\Pt£ADlh<?\M0RSC.3UP

2

I am a duly appoint^ Deputy Constable OT w n g ^

i^w..^-» _

tate of Utah, a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the
ime of service herinf and not a part of or interested in the withia action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
>n the 12 of JUNE , 1991 , and served the same upon MORSE, CLARE T.
(

within named defendant in said,

(
(

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
>y serving a true copy of said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
for the defendant with

CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY)

a person of suitable age and descretion there residing at,
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

• SOUTH JORDAN

his/her usual place of ABODE

• on this 13 day of JUNE ,f9S

I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
I endoresed the date and place of service and added my name and offical
title therto.
On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991
Deputy

^ ^ A H ^ /

Deputy Constable
Sandy Precinct, Salt Lake County
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991

My Commissian Expires: April 20 199S
Notarr Public
Fee's

S e r v i c e Fee
Mileage
2nd address
3 r d address
Copies
P&H/Extra's
Total

j L > < W
/I
{/

6.00/y |
U \

6.00

fflt

/>/jj/.^

\

NOTARY PUBUC
JEAKY UsOSLUM
t » s North «75w#«t
W*st Bound**. UT 54067
My Commotion Expirm
Apr! 20,1995
STATE OF UTAH

$ t 8 t

' °f

Ut

* ih
'

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

o >*rft
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

MOTION AND ORDER OF
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court
for an order requiring defendant, Transamerica Equities, Inc., to
appear before this Court to answer questions under oath concerning
its property, and to restrain defendant from disposing of its nonexempt property pending the hearing.- Judgment was entered, against
defendant on the date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of
which

Fifty

Thousand

Two Hundred

Thirty

and No/100 Dollars

($50,230.00) is still unpaid.
DATED this

\\

QyXOrcT. Oficrsc- p n s +Aqen/"

-f^Vc

day of June, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

Mar]

L. Bat*

Z 1Z0 CK> *t3o>. 1>«^-J~ Attorney*for P l a i n t i f f
C:\HLB\PLEADING\TRAHSAME.SUP

ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.:
IT IS ORDERED, that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and
good cause appearing, yOu appear in person before this Court at the
time

and

place

shown

below

to

answer

questions

under oath

concerning your property.
DATE : Thursday, June 20, 1991
TIME : 8:30 a.m.
PLACE: Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not "to sell, loan, give away,--or
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing.
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest.
DATED this

//-- day of June, 1991.
BYTHE COURT:

•

Circuit Court Judge
Attest Clerk of the Circuit Court

By:
Serve Defendant:
Transamerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107

C: \MLB\PLEADINa\TRANSAME.SUP
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.

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of SandV Precinct, ;>«±v ^«^^
tate of Utah, a citizen of the United States 6ver

the age of 21 years at the

line of service her in, and not a part of or interested in the withinr action.
1 received the within and hereto annexed,
4JPPLEHENTAL ORDER
>n the 12 of JUNE , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAHERICA EQUITIES INC.
(

i within named defendant in said,

(
(

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
:>y serving a true copy of said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
for the defendant with

CLARE T. MORSE (PRESIDENT)

a person of suitable ag^ and descretion there residing at,
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

• SALT LAKE CITY

his/her usual place of A80DE
. on this 13 day of JUNE ,59
I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
I endoresed the date and place Df service and added my. name and offical
title therto.
On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991
Deputy^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Deputy Constable
Sandy Precinct, Salt Lake County
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
My Commissian Expires: April 20 199S
Notary Public
H / OsnM

On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991
^
('/£

COJ^*^-^J
hOT^BY PUBLIC

J*AK*Ut?AJil±Mi

Fee s

service ^ ^
Mileage
9n H address
3rd address
Copies
P&H/Extra's
^ .
Total

</ ^

0<y

nMj'n
I xSLZSy

_-__==========«
20.00

w*aBoi*rtiu.uTS4087
A<xt2o. i»s

State of Utah

M-

0

5 J99i

DATF/^JCA i

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

//TIME.

UPC QJjWA-T'

&afl&L*z—
'-:;::;:JTY UTAH

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

MOTION AND ORDER OF
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSg and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court
for an order requiring defendant, Clare T. Morse, to appear before
this Court to answer questions under oath concerning its property,
and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-exempt property
pending the hearing. Judgment was^ entered against defendant on thedate of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred
Thirty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of which Fifty
Thousand Two Hurdred Th:L^» and Nc/100 Dollars- ($50,230.00) is
still unpaid.
DATED this
6&)Z So. 3U l/C. &Z4C
yvturrau
16,00 U). fltfOOZo.
So. Jpfd*t)
C: \HL8\PUA&ING\M0RSE2.SUF

Z*0

day of June, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

Marl
Attorney

ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE:
IT ts ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the
time

and

pl^ce

shovm

below

concerning yo^r property.
DATfe
TIMfc
PLA^E

to

answer

questions

under

oath

3uk23

Tuesday, 7wlipiifl^ 1991
8:30 a.m.
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED ndf'to sell, loan, give away, -or
otherwise dispose Q f your non-exempt property pending this hearing.
If you have b ^ e n personally served with this order and you fail to
appear, the C<^urt may order a warrant for your arrest.
DAT^;D this &>Q " day of June, 1991.

BY THjag^URT:

^^

#

j ^ j J U ^ r c u i t Court Judge
_^
A t t e s t Clerk of the STroiii^ 7 Court
By:

<£jy

Serve Defendant:
Clare T. Mors^/ President and Registered Agent
Transaxnerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 32Q west #200
or
Clare T* Morsq
1600 West 114Qo South
South Jordan, utah 84065
C:\MLB\PLEADiaO\HOKSE2.SUF
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I. S. MANN
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
i citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
herin, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
on the 5

of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon MORSE, CLARE T.
(

a within named defendant in said,

(
(

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
by serving a true copy of said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
for the defendant with

CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY)

a person of suitable age arxi descretion there residing at,
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

, SOUTH JORDAN

his/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 10 day of JULY f199

I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
I endoresed the date and place of service and added my name and^offical
title therto.
On the 10 day of JULY , 1991
Deputy

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995
Notary Public
Fee's

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd address
3rd address
Copies
P&H/Extra's
Total

25.00

y^~\

Deput^-etfns table
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Robert J. Reitz Constable
On the 10 day of JULY , 1991

JUL

5

0l

I

lm*\t

«•!*• I -w

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

•)<h

S^f.J- i SrCIUJl ? - . ^ t . v J : i T Y UTAH

TEPUTY

i ^^T"^^^^2^-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

MOTION AND ORDER OF
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil NO.910900069CN

CLARE T. MORSE and
TPiMglMRBTrft

FfflTTTTEg

TMP.

Defendants.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court
for an order requiring defendant, Transamerica Equities, Inc., to
appear before this Court to answer questions under oath concerning
its property, and to restrain defendant from disposing of its nonexempt property pending the hearing,

Judgment was entered against,

defendant on the date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of
which

Fifty

Thousand

Two Hundred

Thirty

and No/100

($50,230.00) is still unpaid.
_

.

/„ DATED this

^ 2 . <$V 2&U).

^iSt

'J

^€
'

day of June, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

or
Marlon L. Bates
Attorney for Plaintiff
C: \HI.B\n.EAMNG\TJWISAM2.SUF

Dollars

ORDER
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.:
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the
time

and

place

shown below

concerning your property.

to

answer

questions under oath

^ i „

oUAuZo
DATE : Tuesday, tTjpi'f ^ , 1991
TIME : 8:30 a.m.
PLACE: Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not to sell, loan, give away, or
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing.
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest.
DATED this (90

day of June, 1991.
BY_™»E^COURT:

§XuiX\ccj -Circuit—Court Judg*e ^ ) . ^
A t t e s t Clerk of the Circuit 'Court
By:
Serve Defendant:
Transamerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107
or
Transamerica Equites, Inc.
c/o Clare T. Morse, President
1600 West 11400 South
South Jordan, Utah 84065
C: \MLB\PLEADIW 0\TRAKSAM2. SUP

<^k
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J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

BY

^ftrft
:>-'^Tf CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO STRIKE ANSWER AND AWARD
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ATTORNEY'S
FEES
Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

In response to plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents, this Court ordered defendants to produce the long
awaited documents within 15 days of the Court's minute entry or the
defendants' answer would be struck and default judgment would be
entered against defendants as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint.
The defendants have wholly failed to produce said documents or any
of them within said period of time (See Affidavit of Marlon L.
Bates, par. 3 ) . Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 37(b), plaintiff is
entitled to receive an order striking defendants' answer and
granting default judgment in the amount of Fifty Thousand and
No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) together with lost profits of the joint
C:\m.B\PLEADING\MOBSB.MEM

venture, prejudgment interest at the legal rate, punitive damages,
court costs, and attorney's fees incurred herein, all in amounts to
be proved upon an evidentiary hearing, and attorney's fees in the
amount of One Hundred Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($115.00) for
bringing the Motion to Compel, and attorney's fees in the amount of
One Hundred Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($115-00) for bringing this
Motion to Strike, together with its accompanying Memorandum of
Points and Authorities and the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates,
attorney for plaintiff.
DATED this ^ 3

day of April, 1991.
SCALLEY & READING

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 23

day of April, 1991,

I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Strike
Answer and Award Default Judgment and Attorney's Fees together with
Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates to the following:
Grant G. Orton, Esq.
2670 South 2000 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

^ffrnnio \?nnd_
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.MEM
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EXIBIT V I I I

WESLEY F. SINE (2967)
Attorney for Defendants
349 South 200 East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5125

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
SET ASIDE SANCTIONS AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

Civil No.: 910900069CN

Defendant So

From
Orton

January

(attorney

of
for

I.

INTRODUCTION

1991

to the end

Defendants

of

May of

Transamerica

1991, Grant

Equities,

Inc.,

and Clare T. Morse), served as an Army Reserve Battalion
Commander
of

of

the

141'st

M.I. Battalion.

During

that

period

time, part of his unit was called up, necessitating Grant

Orton 1 s

efforts

to follow

through

on

their

call up.

During

part of that period Grant Orton was out of the state on
military call up and during part of that time was at the local
headquarters

for

On his part

it was not a full time call up but

him

away

the

141'st

from his practice

of the time.

military

of

intelligence

battalion.
it did take

law for a considerable

amount

This Judgment was taken during that period of time.
Defendants claim that but for this national emergency and a
subsequent problem with their attorney's mail collection, this
Judgment would not have happened.
Section 60 (b)(1) of U.C.A. allows for a setting aside
of a judgment if within three months of the Judgment on a basis
of excusable neglect.

The Judgment was taken on June 3, 1991

and a Motion to Set Aside was filed on August 23, 1991.

This

falls within those paramaters, since 6he Motion was taken well
within the three month allowance.
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Grant Orton in his Affidavit of August 23, 1991 stated

in paragraph number 4 that "During the months of January through
May 1991, I have had numerous military assignments outside
of the state of Utah".
2.

Grant Orton further states that while he was away,

"the mail has been retained on occasion by the postal service
when his part time secretary did not pick it up in a timely
fashion"e
3.

Grant Orton further states that there was not mail

retained for him at the post office.
4.

Grant Orton also states in his Affidavit that "he

had never received notice of Plaintiff's Judgment nor of the
motions filed preliminary to the granting of the Judgment".

-2-

5o

Answers to interrogatories were filed with the

Plaintiffs,
6C

On April 18, 1991, under Plaintiff's Statement of

Facts (par, 6 ) , Plaintiff's attorney claims he spoke with Grant
Orton but further on down states that Plaintiff's attorney
spoke with Mrc Morse; but this must be a mistake as there is
no evidence that he spoke with Mr. Morse, only Grant Orton.
7.

Clare T. Morse was not the registered agent of

Transamerica Equities or its President .at- the time of service
of the Supplemental Hearing Motion and Order (see exhibit A ) .
Ill,

ARGUMENT

The period of time, within which Plaintiff complains of
"an inexcusable pattern of total neglect", falls during the
crisis in the Gulf War,

Grant Orton is a citizen soldier

serving as the Commander of the 141'st Military Batallion for
the Army Reserve,

While his whole unit was not called up during

the War, approximately half of it was called to active duty
necessitating his call up for periods of time to effect their
call up and later their reactivation after the peace was won.
This all happened during the period of time complained of and
caused the problems complained of by the Plaintiff.

Most of

the items complained of can be explained not upon willfull
denial of the law, but because of the particular situation
that attorney Orton found himself in, plus a lack of
communication caused by a problem with the mail which was not
timely discovered due to the military obligations of attorney

-3-

Orton.

So far as Clare T. Morse not answering the Supplemental

Hearings timely, these items were also turned over to Grant
Orton who was to apply for a setting aside of the judgment,
but again because of military obligations it was not handled.
Defendant's attorney tried to cover all bases, i.e.,
serving his country and protecting his clients.

Unfortunately,

this particular Plaintiff was not concerned with its country's
problems but only in expediting an unconscionable lawsuit and
took advantage of Mr. Orton 1 s military obligations.

Mr. Orton

had arranged for his mail to be held for him but during the
period of April, May, and June something happened that prevented
the mail from reaching Mr. Orton.

Therefore this Judgment

was taken without the Defendants knowing of it until being
served for a Supplemental Hearing.
Once again the Defendants turned to their trusted legal
counsel to straighten out the Default Judgment problem but
the military was still calling and Lieutenant Colonel Orton
was now striving to deactivate his people once again pulling
him away from his legal responsibilities.

This is why the

present counsel was hired to represent the plaintiffs until
Grant Orton could committ enough time to represent them
properly.
Mr. Orton could not solve his mail problem until he was
aware of the problem, by the time he was aware of the problem,
the damage had been done.

Problems with mail is not an unheard

-4-

of event.

Coupled with his partial military call up created

the problem we have here.
IV,

CONCLUSION

This case cries out for justice.
for this type of problem.

Rule 60(b)(1) is written

A war, a lawyer who is a citizen

soldier, a mix up with the mail all added together have caused
damage to Defendants by a default judgment having been given
to the Plaintiffs upon a complaint which was defendable by
Defendants*

Plaintiffs will not be hurt if this is set aside

so that Defendants may have their day in court; but justice
will be served.
All of us should feel a debt of gratitude for citizen
soldiers like Grant Orton and we should not penalize the
Defendants because the lawyer they chose was dedicated to
serving his country and failed to adequately represent them
because of a mix up in the mail and the military pressures
of the moment.

Certainly a once in a life time problem should

not be left uncorrected.
For these reasons Defendants respectfully request their
Motion be allowed and the Judgment sent aside.
DATED this J23&/&*Y

of

September, 199V.

/^-WESLEY F. SIN^
Attorney for'Defendants

-5-

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of September, 1991,

I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid of the
foregoing

REPLY

TO

PLAINTIFF'S

OPPOSITION

TO

MOTION

ASIDE SANCTIONS AND JUDGMENT to:

J. Bruce Reading
Marlon L. Bates
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
261 East 300 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/Samantha Lane

£x

TO

SET

EXHIBIT IX

Wesley F. Sine (2967)
Attorney for Defendant
349 South 200 East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5125

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

]
•
i

AFFIDAVIT OF GRANT G. ORTi
Civil No.: 91090069CN
JUDGE:

WILKINSON

]

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
GRANT G. ORTON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes

and says:
1.

That I am an adult citizen over the age of

18

and resident of the United States of America and of the State
of Utah, and I make this Affidavit on the basis of facts that
are within my personal knowledge in support of Defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment filed and served herewith.
2.

I am now and at all times since 1977 have been a

member in good standing of the Utah State Bar engaged in the
active full-time practice of law in the State of Utah.
3.

Upon reviewing the files and inquiring into this

natter I found that I had never received notice of plaintiff's

Judgment nor of the Motions apparently filed preliminary to
the granting of Judgment„
4.

The mail to my office is delivered to a mail box

in front of the building where my office is located,,

During

the months of January through May 1991, I have had numerous
military assignments outside of the State of Utah, and during
that time the mail has been retained on occasion by the Postal
Service when my part-time secretary has not picked it up in
a timely fashion*
5.

In the past when this happened, it has been retained

by the post office for it to be picked up there.

Upon checking

with the post office I have not found that this was the case
since there is no such mail retained by the Postal Service.
6o

Had I become aware from any source that a Motions

preliminary to the granting of judgment had been served in
any manner, including by mail, I would have-taken action
necessary to timely prepare, file and~serve an appropriate
response thereto.

M
7.

>>, Transamerica Equities, and Clare T. Morse, hold

and claim valid and meritorious defenses and-offsets to each
of the issues raised by plaintiff's
complaint, and have asserted them inj»y answer.
DATED this >jp(// day of August, 1991.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c£S^W day of August,
1191 .
-9-

X 9

& •

riTNlli

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
lerin, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
>n the 5

of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAMERICA EQUITIESf
(INC.
i within named defendant in said,
(
(

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
oy serving a true copy of said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
for the defendant with

CLARE T. MORSE (PRESIDENT & RES AGENT)

a person of suitable age and descretion there residing at,
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

• SOUTH JORDAN

his/her usual place of A800E

, on this 10 day of

JULY,19s

I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
I endoresed the date and place_pf_service_and added my name^and.offical
title therto.
On the 10 day of

JULY, 1991

Deputy Constable
Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Robert J. Reitz Constable
Subscribed and sworn to before me this -On the 10 day of JUL , 1991
My Commissian Expires* April 20 1995
Notary Public
Fee's

(j / s> _ .>,

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd address
3rd address
Copies
P&H/Extra's
Total

6.00

/fl^^Ti^/y/f

/State of Utah

CAniDii n

JUL 2 5 !99i

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

UPON

f*->Wl

:»~AcJ>4*. ffe/f*.

etc mi

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
i - .Defendants.

Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

iLOO yd. MHo.
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE:
ttffAU

I-t

appears..from the records of this court that.you_were

Vordered to appear in person before the District Court at the-time
and place shown below to answer questions under oath concerning
your property.
Date:
Time:
Place:

July 23, 1991
8:30 a.m.
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

The records of this court further show that the order was
served upon you, and that you failed to appear as required.

C:\MLB\PLEADINO\MORSE.OSC

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that you appear in person before
a judge of the District Court at:
Date:
Time:
Place:

August 13, 1991
8:30 a.m.
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt of court
for failure to obey a lawful order of this court*
DATED this

<

^ ^

day of July, 1991.

District Court Judge
Attest Clerk of the District Court

By:

<g<^
Deputy/Clerk

Serve Defendant:
Clare T. Morse, President and_Registered Agept
Transamerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107
or
Clare T* Morse
1600 West 11400 South
South Jordan, Utah 84065

C: \MLB\PLEADINO\MORSE. OSC
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I, O. HAOSEN

• being rii^v ~~*,v — • -

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constablet Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
>rinf and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
*DER TO SHOW CAUSE
n the 25 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon HORSE 9 CLARE T.
within named defendant in said,

(
(

RDER TO SHOW CAUSE
y serving a true copy of said,
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE
or the defendant with

CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY)

person of suitable age and descretion there residing at,
L600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

. SOUTH JORDAN

Us/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 6 day of AUG ,199

I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
5RDER TO SHOW CAUSE
I endoresed the date and pl,ace of. service_ and added my. name and offical_
title therto*
On the 6 day of AUG
Deputy

, 1991

SL 802
Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County
396 Cypress St..Midvale UT . 84047 580-1741
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995
Notary Public
^\td^UA
cAe»s
tee
S

Service Fee
*
*HHr e S S
adareso
address

On the 6 day of AUG
^

('/t ( A A £ I ^ ^ \
**Sl
v"C°Tr5fcv
NOTARY PU8UC
6 - 0<7 A /%2^^»v
JEANY McCLctLAN
/ /
l/\ fffg3&;&\
122sNortherow**
12SS
North 6 7 5 W c
1O Q
0<V ff/^^V^
«
i' IV mVKT I ( : ( T C O r ) § } W«a Bountiful. UT &4037
1*7 . W I f«/ « 3 3 | \ toi w # s t Bountiful. UT &403
10.00
%%H^M My Comnmion -* P ,es
1
AOTH 20.1995
|I NC
^ i^--^/
^
STATE
of UT AH

es
Extra's

35.00

, 1991

State of Utah

k»#*l 19W1 I I
J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2$1 East 300 South, Suit© 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

to ftyl

C*n.//*y«. fTt.1^
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
gRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
,„,-.,,
Of

/

L

, ^Defendants.

Civil NO.910900069CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC:

00 |/v. lllfCv^>C.

it appears from the records of this court that you were

ordered to appear in person before^ the_£istricjb_ Court_at the_t±me_
and place shown below to answer questions under oath concerning
your property.
Date:
Time:
Place:

July 23, 1991
8:30 a.m.
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

The records of this court further show that the order was
served upon you, and that you failed to appear as required.
j^Au-J^ lw«Jt*

C:\MLB\PLEADIN0\TRANSAMK.O3C

JT/CO'

It O. MADSEN

9

being TIT^V* wvi*/f

—

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County* State of Utah,
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
rin, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
4DER TO SHOW CAUSE
n the 25 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES,
(INC.
within named defendant in said,
(
(

RDER TO SHOW CAUSE
y serving a true copy of said,
«DER TO SHOW CAUSE
or the defendant with

CLARE T* MORSE (REG^GENT)

t person of suitable age and descretion there residing at,
L600 WEST 11400 SOUTH

, SOUTH JORDAN

his/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 6

day of AUG

P19S

I further certify that at the time of service of the said,
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
I endoresed the date and place of s.er.vice. and adde.d jny name and offical
title thertOc
On the 6

day of AUG

, 1991

Deputy

SL 802

Robert Reit2 Constable, Salt Lake County
396 Cypress St.,Midvale UT . 84047 580-174
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

On the 6

day of AUG

My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995
Notary Public
Fee's

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd address
3rd address
Copies
P&H/Extra's
Total

A 6.00/

>

MtCUt*
NOTARY PUBUC
JEANY McCLcUAM
129$ North 67$ West
W*st Bountifui, UT e-087
My Cor.vnis6.on *• \; ?s
STATE C r UTAH

6.00

1991

State of Utah

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that you appear in person before
a judge of the District Court at:
Date:
Time:
Place:

August 13, 1991
8:30 a.m.
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Room #303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt of court
for failure to obey a lawful order of this court.
DATED this J&Z-

day of July, 1991.

ristrict Court Judge
Attest Clerk of the District Court
By:,
Deputy^ Clerk
Serve Defendant:
Clare T, Morse, President and Registered Agent
Transaroerica Equities, Inc.
6292 South 320 West #200
Murray, Utah 84107
or
Clare T. Morse
1600 West 11400 South
South Jordan, Utah 84065

C:\ML8\PLEADING\TRAKSAME.OSC

2

wi^£-_
NOTMIJ^yBLIC
Resjt
PodTdiJWTSSCt I

I
I
I•

-3-

V^J^X'

T
Notarypublic
WESIEYJSINE
I
340 SdutiaOO East *170 I
Salt Uks-Ctty.Uah 84111!
MyCommiMton Expire* I
JamaiySBJMS
|
SttBoTbtah

EXHIBIT X

WESLEY F. SINE
(ZVbl)
Attorney tor Defendants
343 South 200 East, Suite 1/0
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-b12b

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
&ENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPNAY, INC.,
Plaintitf,

AFFIDAVIT OF CLARE T. MORSE
Civil No,: 9109000b9CN

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,

JUDGE:

WILKINSON

Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
CLARE T. MORSE, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and says:
1.

That I am an adult citizen over the age of 18 and

resident of the United States of America and of the State of
Utah, and I make this Affidavit on the basis of facts that are
within my personal knowledge in support of Defendant's Motion
To Set Aside Judgment filed and served herewith.
2.

I am now and at all times since 1987 have been an

officer for Transamerica Equities, Inc.
3.

That on behalf of myself and Transamerica Equities,

Inc., I contacted and hired Grant Orton, an attorney in good

standing as a member of the Utah State Bar to represent myself
and Transamerica Equities Inc. in a lawsuit brought by Kendrick
Brothers Construction Company, Inc. on or about the 7th day
of January 1991.
4.

That at all times I believed that our attorney Grant

Orton was properly representing myself and Transamerica
Equities and was not in default with the Court or the
plaintiff.
5.

That during the fall of 1990 and from January to

late May of 1991, Grant Orton was on mTlitary "call"up caused
by the Desert Storm invasion.
6<>

That it was my understanding that during the time

he was away on military call up, that arrangements had been
made by Mr. Orton to protect defendants' rights in this
lawsuit.
7.

That I, nor Transamerica Equities knew that certain

documents had not been delivered to the plaintiffs per court
orderc
8*

That I, nor Transamerica Equities knew of the Default

Judgment entered against us by the Court on or about the 3rd
day of June, 1 991 .
9.

That if I or Transamerica Equities had become aware

from any source that a Motion preliminary to the granting
of Judgment had been served in any manner including mail,
I would have taken any action necessary to timely obtain new

counsel to timely prepare, file, and serve an appropriate
response thereto.
10c
valid

I and Transamerica Equities have, hold, and claim

and meritorious defenses and offsets to each of the

issues raised by plaintiffs complaint, and have asserted them
in our Answer*
11o

I and Transamerica Equities have hired new counsel

to work with Grant Orton on representing us in the future.
DATED this J&MSay

of August, 1991.

CLARlTr. MORSE, personally
TRANSAMERI
BY:

Sr. V.P.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

'"I
I

August, *l 991 .
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I b C > l

|..y commit:... JT^=: I

I hereby certify that a true and correc
foregoing Affidavit of Clare T. Morse, was served upon
plaintiff by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Plaintiff's
Attorneys, J. Bruce Reading and Marlon L. Bates, at 261 East
J00 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage
prepaid, on the J. 3 4

day of August, 1991.

-*i\t>~

dL

amantha Lane

EXHIBIT XI

J. BRUCE READING, #2700
MARLON L. BATES, #4794
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Plaintiff
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION :
COMPANY, INC.,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO SET ASIDE SANCTIONS AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants.

Civil No.910900069CN
:

Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

This matter was heard by the Court on October 18, 1991
with Wesley F. Sine appearing as counsel for defendants and with
Marlon L. Bates appearing as counsel for plaintiff.

Based upon the

motion of the defendants, the opposition of the plaintiff, the
memoranda and affidavits in support thereof, and the arguments made
by counsel at the hearing,

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.ORD

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Set Aside
Sanctions and Judgment is denied.
DATED this 3'

day of October, 1991.
BY THE COURT:

^ ~ 7"%sx^t
Judge Wilkinson

Wesley F* 'Sine
Attorney for Defendants

C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.ORD
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EXHIBIT X I I

r p 'r-'n

O i r i i r - I C T COURT

WESLEY F. SINE (2967)
Attorney for Defendants

A

349 South 200 East,

Suite

Nov 4

170

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-5125

I

OTP^9I

THIRD •
SALT

'TJCT
''

BY_r*YVV£naf*-—

§

DLfti' i

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

^

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, INC.,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
Civil No.

910900069CN

Plaintiff and appellees,

'MM

vs.
CLARE T. MORSE and
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.,
Defendants and Appellees.

few

NOTICE is hereby given that defendants and appellants,
Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. through counsel,
Wesley Fe Sine, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, the final
order of the Honorable Wilkinson, entered in this matter on
October 31, 1991.
The Appeal is taken from the Order of the Court denying
defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Jj^Tcigment,

2SLEY F. SINE
Attorney for Defendants

00193

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid to the
following:
Je Bruce Reading
Marlon L. Bates
Scalley & Reading
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

C/at/rr?as*t£*- O^XJZ
Samantha Lane

0C194

EXHIBIT XIII

o<o
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
. PAUL W. LARSEN CONTRACTOR, INC., a
Utah Corporation, et at., Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14040.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Dec. 18, 1075.

Suit was instituted against a general
contractor and its bondsman to recover for
materials supplied by plaintiff to a subcontractor. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., entered order dismissing action with prejudice and, from denial of motion to vacate
order, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, Crockett, J., held that order dismissing suit with prejudice on ground that
plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute
action was an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding unusual delay in getting case to
t n a \ Vnere &e\ay %vas frue in Yatgt part to
unusual circumstances of case, such as
enormity of discovery materials, and defendants not only failed to manifest any
particular haste in getting pretrial discovery procedures completed, but failed to act
responsively when plaintiff assembled records- and sent messages as to their availability.
Order vacated, and case remanded.
Henriod, C. J., dissented and filed
opinion.

Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 37, 55(c),
60(b).
2. Dismissal and Nonsuit 0=60(3)

Whether there is a justifiable excuse
for a failure to prosecute is to be determined by • considering more factors than
merely length of time from filing suit;
some consideration should be given to the
conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity each has had to move the case forward and what they have done about it, together with the difficulty or prejudice that
might have been caused to the other side,
and the injustice that might result from a
dismissal. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
37, 55(c), 60(b).
3. Dismissal and Nonsuit C=>60(6)

Order dismissing suit with prejudice
on ground that plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute action was an abuse of
discretion, notwithstanding unusual delay
in getting case to trial, where delay was
due in large part to unusual circumstances
of case, such as enormity of discovery materials,,-and defendants not only failed to
manifest any particular haste in getting
pretrial discovery procedures completed,
but failed to act responsively when plaintiff assembled records and sent messages
as to their availability. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 37, 55(c), 60(b).

C. R. Henrikson, of Hennkson, Fairbourn & Tate, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Joseph J. Palmer, of Moyle & Draper,
Salt Lake City, for Skyline and General.

I. Dismissal and Nonsuit C=60(l)

In order to handle business of court
with efficiency and expedition, trial court
should have a reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing an action for failure to
prosecute if a party fails to move forward
according to rules and directions of court,
without justifiable excuse, but such prerogative falls short of unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result in injustice.

H a r r y D. Pugsley, Salt Lake City, for
Larsen.
CROCKETT, Justice:
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company
sued Skyline Construction, general contractor, for balance due for electrical equipment it had supplied to a subcontractor,
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., for construction of the Behavioral Science Build-

tion to the time involved in reciprocal
pleadings, considerable time was consumed
in connection with discovery procedures.
As a result of the delays, the trial court
granted defendants' motion to dismiss on
the ground that plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute the action 2 ; and included
in its order that the action is "dismissed
with prejudice" and that, " . . . this
judgment be and is hereby determined to
be a final judgment."
Plaintiff filed motions to vacate the order; and also to delete therefrom the just
quoted provisions and grant a trial on the
merits. From a denial of these motions
plaintiff appeals, contending that the court
abused its discretion.
In performing its subcontract to install
the electrical system and equipment, Larsen
purchased its supplies from Westinghouse.
Defendant General Insurance Company of
America furnished the required bond to insure payments to material men. 3 During
the course of construction, in 1970, Larsen
fell into financial difficulties and was unable to keep current its payments to Westinghouse. In order to assure Westinghouse
would be paid, in May of that year, the
three parties agreed that thereafter Skyline
would make Larsen's checks payable jointly to Larsen and Westinghouse and that
future purchases were to be approved by
Skyline, ordered on its forms and invoiced
to Skyline.
Despite this arrangement, difficulties
still persisted in getting the account paid.
Westinghouse gave formal notice on February 25,' 1971, requiring payment by Skyline and/or its bondsman General Insurance. Payment not being forthcoming, on
July 14, 1971, Westinghouse's counsel
wrote to Skyline claiming $41,357.22 for
1. The essential facts recited herein are substantially without dispute as shown by the
record and the affidavit of Westinghouse's
counsel.
2. Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. provides that: For
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute a defendant may move for dismissal of an action.

materials iurnisfted to Larsen, of which
$22,541.14 was invoiced to Skyline. On
February 10, 1972, Westinghouse commenced this action against Skyline, Larsen,
and General Insurance for the $41,357.22.
(Larsen is not a party to this appeal. For
that reason, its dealings with Westinghouse
and its conduct in the lawsuit are not discussed. Skyline and General are hereafter
referred to collectively as "defendants.")
On February 17, 1972, defendants filed a
motion to dismiss Westinghouse's complaint for failure to state the date of last
delivery of materials. 4 And, on the same
day, defendants' counsel wrote Westinghouse's counsel and requested that Westinghouse collect the invoices on those
goods sold directly to Larsen and provide a
record of all payments by either Skyline or
Larsen.
It is indicated that some efforts were
made to settle the matter. But after it appeared that they would not be successful,
Westinghouse noticed up for hearing defendants' motion to dismiss on July 20,
1973. The following month, on August 15,
1973, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
on the^additronal ground of failure to prosecute the action and in a supporting affidavit stated:
That Westinghouse had not produced
the invoices and records requested; that
in September, 1972, Skyline had assigned
its assets for benefit of its creditors;
that in October, 1972, Larsen had discontinued operations and gone into receivership ; and that, due to the insolvency and
the release of employees who had knowledge of the materials used and Westinghouse's failure to provide requested information, the defendants' ability to defend the action was substantially impaired.
3. Pursuant to § 14-1-5, U.C.A.1953.
4. Sec. 14-1-6, U.C.A.1953, requires written
notice to the general contractor within 90
days and that suit be commenced within one
year after the day on which the last labor
or materials were supplied.

The District Court denied both of the
motions to dismiss on August 20, 1973, and
allowed Westinghouse to amend the complaint to allege the last date of delivery of
materials, which it did the next day, August 21, 1973. Shortly thereafter, on September 10, 1973, Westinghouse's counsel
sent to the defendants copies of 102 unpaid
invoices, 45 pertaining to the Larsen account and 57 pertaining to the Skyline account, with a letter requesting the defendants to review the invoices as soon as possible, because they would be followed by
interrogatories and other discovery procedures.
The defendants answered on September
12, 1973, and filed a request that Westinghouse produce within one month, at the office of defendants' counsel, all documents
pertaining
to Westinghouse's
claims:
(1) purchase orders; (2) delivery receipts
and invoices; (3) records as to payments;
(4) any notices given by Westinghouse of
claims on the performance bond; (5) all
documents, notes, letters or memoranda
pertaining to conversations; and (6) ail
correspondence, between the parties.
With respect to that demand, these facts
are noteworthy: that it was a very extensive request; and that much of the material requested, or copies thereof, should have
already been in possession of the defendants. Plaintiff Westinghouse is a large
concern, having national and in fact
world-wide operations, of which the Salt
Lake City office is only a regional distribution center. The electrical supplies involved here had been shipped from various
places and most of them directly from factories or distribution centers to this job;
and each plant issued its own invoices and
maintained its own records.

archive to obtain the documentation required and to transmit it to its Salt Lake
City office.
Counsel for Westinghouse
telephoned the office of defendants' counsel in May, 1974, and left a message that
the records were at Westinghouse's office,
but that due to their volume, defendants'
counsel should come there to examine
them. Again on July 15, 1974, counsel for
Westinghouse telephoned the office of defendants' counsel and, unable to speak with
counsel, left a similar message. This was
a substantial compliance with the request. 5
During October, 1974, Westinghouse's
counsel prepared requests for admissions,
interrogatories, and motions to produce
which were to be served upon the defendants after they had reviewed the documents and records gathered by Westinghouse in its office. But defendants' counsel did not come to make such examination.
Instead of doing so, on January 9, 1975,
the defendants served their second motion
to dismiss for failure of prosecution on the
ground that Westinghouse had not delivered the documents fn accordance with defendants' request. The following day, January 10, 1975, Westinghouse filed the interrogatories, requests for admissions, and
its own motion to produce documents. To
this the defendants filed objections. It
was upon that state of the record, and
upon the basis of the above recited occurrences, that on February 27, 1975, the trial
court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss.
In the light of the foregoing, we turn to
the sole issue presented to this appeal:
whether the granting of that motion with
prejudice was an abuse of discretion.

It is further shown that after this demand, from October, 1973, to May,' 1974,
Westinghouse's personnel spent considerable time and effort searching the company's division depositories and its national

[1,2] In doing so it is appropriate to
have in mind some established principles
applicable to such situations. It is not to
be doubted that in order to handle the business of the court with efficiency and expedition the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for

5. That the making available of voluminous
records satisfies such a demand see Sprague

v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344,
294 P.2d 6S9 (1956).

c i t e as 544 P.2d 876

failure to prosecute 6 if a party fails to
move forward according to the rules and
the directions of the court, without justifiable excuse. 7 But that prerogative falls
short of unreasonable and arbitrary action
which will result in injustice. Whether
there is such justifiable excuse is to be determined by considering more factors than
merely the length of time since the suit
was filed. Some consideration should be
given to the conduct of both parties, and to
the opportunity each has had to move the
case forward and what they have done
about it 8 ; and also what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side; and most important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal
[3] Applying those principles here,
these observations are pertinent: although
there was unusual delay in getting this
case to trial, this was due in large part to
the
unusual
circumstances
delineated
above. Further, we are not impressed that
the defendants themselves were overly diligent or manifest any particular haste in
getting the pretrial discovery procedures
completed and on with the trial. They did
not do so in responsive action to Westinghouse's having assembled records, nor to
the latter's messages concerning their
availability, nor did they seek any assistance from the court. 9
It. is indeed commendable to handle cases
with dispatch and to move calendars with
expedition in order to keep them up to
date. But it is even more important to
keep in mind that the very reason for the
existence of courts is to afford disputants
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them. In conformity with
that principle the courts generally tend to
6c See Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29
Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 52S (1973) ; Brasher
Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969).
7. See Rule 37 U.R.C.P.; Maxfield v. Fishier,
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975).
8. See Crystal Line & Cement Co. v. Robbins,
8 Utah 2d 3S9, 335 P,2d 624 (1959) ; Wright
v. Howe, 46 Utah 588, 150 P. 956 (1915).

favor granting relief from default judgments where there is any reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 10
It is our conclusion that the trial court
failed to give proper weight to the higher
priority; and that under the circumstances
described herein, the order of dismissal
was an abuse of discretion. It is therefore
necessary that the order be vacated and the
case remanded for further proceedings.
Costs to plaintiff (appellant).
E L L E T T , T U C K E T T and MAUGHAN,
JJ., concur.
H E N R I O D , Chief Justice (dissenting):
I dissent,—noting at the outset that the
main opinion's footnote to its first sentence, disarmingly emphasizes that "The
essential facts recited herein are substantially without dispute . . . "—which is
not the test for reversal,—that being
whether there are substantial believable
facts to support the lower court.
Plaintiff furnished equipment to Skyline,
general contractor, and to Larsen, its subcontractor, starting in 1970 and continuing
in 1971. Defendant, General Insurance,
was the statutory 1 surety to pay for such
equipment if Skyline defaulted, which it
apparently did, for an undetermined
amount.
Westinghouse claimed it was
about $64,000, which defendants generally
denied.
Westinghouse sued on February 10, 1972,
after unsuccessful negotiations for an accounting and payment had been indulged
by the parties for a considerable length of
time prior to the institution of this litigation. The suit was prompted, apparently,
9. As permitted by Rule 37, U.R.C.P.
10. See Rule 55(c) and 60(b), U.R.C.P.;
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah
2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962) ; Utah Commercial <& Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah
198, 53 P. 1033 (1898).
I. Title 14-1-5, U.C.A.1953.

..v, K.umyiy wun tne statutory requirement
to file suit within one year after the test
materials are furnished. 2 There was no
counterclaim,—only an answer.
About 90% of the record consisted of
communications, motions, memoranda, requests ior production oi documents, interrogatories, etc.
The salient, believable, admissible facts
that support the trial judge's decision, arrived at by the exercise of his uiscretitfn,
—which the rules say is his,—together
with the principle that on appellate review,
the trial judge is affirmed unless arbitrary
and capricious to the point reflecting a
clear abuse of discretion, 3 fairly may be
condensed thus:
In 1970-71, plaintiff furnished materials
to Skyline and Larsen, the general and
subcontractor defendants. The last were
delivered on October 27, 1971. The complaint followed on February 2, 1972.4 A
week later, on February 9, 1972, defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state <*
claim, which has little significance here.
A couple of weeks later, on February £4,
1972, defendant Larsen requested records
of plaintiff, having to do with sales, delivery, payments, and the like. 5 Plaintiff did
not answer interrogatories presented until
five months later, on July 17, 1972, and
then simply responded to the effect that it
had some receipts.
A year and one month later, on August
15, 1973, defendants, through their counsel's affidavit, complained that plaintiff
had not furnished the requested recoro15
and filed a motion to dismiss under Riile
41(b), "for failure . . .
to prosecute
. " Two days later, plaintiff's counsel advised defendant's counsel that the
records were ready. Five days later, on
August 22, 1973, the motion was denied
2. Title 14-1-6, U.C.A.1953.
P.2d 528 (1973).
4. During which period the parties appeared
to have been trying to reconcile their accounting.

and plaintiff was given ten days to amend
(obviously to allow plaintiff to allege when
the last materials had been furnished, a
fact plaintiff had neglected to allege in its
complaint). About five months later, on
January 9, 1975, which was about 15
miss for lack of prosecution (August 15,
1973, supra) and about three years after
the complaint was filed, defendants again
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
prosecute the action, as had been the case
on August 15, 1973. There followed a
number of motions, notices, memoranda,
affidavits, etc. when the motion was granted dismissing the action with prejudice.
During the three years this action was
pending, the two defendants that primarily
were obligated to pay for the materials went
broke.
There is substantial evidence to the effect that the delay presented a practical,
difficult problem for the remaining defendant,—the only one with means,-—to accumulate evidence because of scattering of
the personnel of the other two, coupled
VvtYi t'ne circumstances ot dimming memories, all oj^which gave the remaining defendant a rather slim chance of assuming a
burden of going forward,—which basically
was that of the plaintiff.
Under the circumstances of this case,
hardly can it be said that the trial judge's
mandate arose out of an arbitrary or capricious abuse of his discretion.
On more than one occasion, this court
has defended and affirmed such discretionary orders against a charge of abuse, in
cases appearing factually to justify affirmance of the order here, as much as justified affirmance on the facts prevailing in
those cases. About the most recent is
Thompson Ditch z\ Jackson, 29 Utah 2d
5. Which had to be gathered from out of state
sources, making it difficult to examine in
plaintiff's local office.

mously we said:
The ruling of the court below will not
be disturbed on appeal unless the record
plainly shows that the court beloW
abused its discretion. The action of the
court was taken in accordance with the
provisions oi Ru\e <VHV) . . . ?&
follows: . . . For failure
to prosecute . . .
It is to be noted that we sustained the
order there on the merits, the order not
having been made with or without prejudice. The rest of the same Rule 41(b)
takes care of any such unspecific order
when it states that:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this subdivision and any dismissal
not provided for . . . operates as
an adjudication on the merits.
The plaintiff in its brief asked only
"that this court reverse the trial court,
reinstate appellant's action . . . and
order the case to be set for trial upon the
merits." It did not ask for a dismissal
without prejudice, so that it would be inapropos for this court to send the case back
for entry of an unsolicited order of dismissal without prejudice,—which might initiate a new round of protraction perhaps as
great or greater than that prevailing to
date.
Besides Thompson Ditch v. Jackson, supra, in Pacer v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah
1975), similar language was expressed,
wherein, although not a case under Rule
41(b), the court refused to set aside a default judgment, we said, "We, on appeal,
should not. reverse its ruling except for
abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbitrary, capricious, or not based on adequate
findings of fact or on the law."
Such was the case also in Brasher z'.
Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464

mentioned but not the basis of the opinion,
we said that the court has an inherent discretion, irrespective of the Rule, to dismiss
for lack of prosecution and that in doing
so we affirm unless there is manifest abuse
of discretion reflected, adopting the rule
reflected in Reed ^^ First Xatioual Bank,
194 Or. 45, 241 P.2d 109 (1952), which
said:
In dismissing an action for want of
prosecution, the court may proceed under
the statute, or it may, of its own motion,
take action to that end. In acting on its
own motion, the court must proceed with
judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest
from the record that the court's discretion has been abused. 6
In my opinion the main opinion has substituted its own unwarranted choice of the
evidence as a substitute for what many
times we have held to be the prerogative
of the fact-finder,—which we have said
elsewhere is in an advantaged position to
observe, discern, weigh, canvass, review
and determine,—but not in the instant inOne &t the" hallmarkian principles espoused by such opinion is that:
Some consideration should be given to
the conduct of both parties, and to the
opportunity each has had to move the
case forward and what they have done
about it; and also what difficulty or
prejudice may have been caused to the
other side; and most important, what injustice may result from the dismissal.
Applying such technique here, the evidence eminently adjusts itself to such
words of wisdom or platitudes, as one
chooses,—which prompts me to suggest
that the trial court here should be affirmed, since apparently such principles
were considered.

6. See also Haxfield v. Fishier, Utah, 538 P.2<* 1323, this Court, and 24 Am.Jur. 49, Dismissal
Bee. £&.
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Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah
1987); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah C t
App. 1987); Kathy's Food Stores, Inc. v. Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah
1988); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill,
762 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wade v. Burke, 131
Utah Adv. Rep. 94 (Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexamination?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs
§§ 14,26 to 36,87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 46 to
166; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1.
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for
expenses incurred in relation to services for client, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256.
Effect on compensation of architect or building contractor of express provision in private
building contract limiting the cost of the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Recoverability under property insurance or
insurance against liability for property damage of insured's expenses to prevent or mitigate damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262.
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66
A.L.R.3d 1087.
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing
party" for purposes of awarding costs where
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66
A.L.R.3d 1115.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Allocation of defense costs between primary
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th
107.
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or
other sanctions against attorney who fails to
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29
A.L.R.4th 160.
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Modern status of state court rules governing
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80
A.L.R.4th 707.
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R.
Fed. 168.
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 24 to
135; Costs «=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.;
Judgment «=> 1.

Rule 55- Default
(a) Default
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
161
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5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaulting party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is
not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule
54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief
by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 55, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Damages.
Default.
—Divorce action.
—Notice.
—Time for appeal.
Judgment.
—Conduct of counsel.
—Default entry necessary.
—Failure to follow rule.
—Hearing on merits.
—Punitive damages.
Setting aside default.
—Collateral attack.
—Direct attack.
—Discretion of court.
—Grounds.

Excusable neglect.
—Judicial attitude.
—Meritorious defense.
—Movant's duty.
—Setting aside proper.
Cited.
Damages.
A default judgment establishes, as a matter
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as
to each cause of action alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon
the nondefaulting party to establish by competent evidence the amount of recoverable damages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue
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Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 AX.R.3d 845
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.

Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 AX.R.4th 1049.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seam a n i n a c t i 0 ns under Jones Act (46 USCS
A p p x § ggg) o r d o c t r i n e 0 f unseaworthinessmodern cases

%

A L R

Fed

541

Excessiveness

or adequacy of awards of dama g e s f o r p e ^ ^ i n j u r y o r d e a t h i n a c t i o n s unJ n J i Ew l i
»?• L-I-X. A i / i c n o r c
*?**?*
^ ° ^ Liability Act (45 USCS
§ 51 et
§
seq.)~modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189
*
_
,
m
Ke
y Numbers. - New Trial «=> 13 et seq.,
HO, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order,
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders* During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion

to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24,
78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administration.
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